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Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities
By Jack M. Beard
_______________________________________________________________________

ABSTRACT
On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China conducted a successful test of an
anti-satellite weapon against one of its own aging weather satellites that produced a
massive cloud of long-lasting orbital debris in space. The test highlighted both the
growing possibility that orbital debris may ultimately render space unusable for all
activities there and the reality of an increasingly militarized, contested and insecure
geopolitical space environment. Largely in response to this incident, and in an effort to
enhance the safety, security and sustainability of space activities, the European Union
developed a draft “International Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space” (the
ICoC or the Code) in 2008. The proposed Code, which continues to be debated by the
international community, is an example of a legally non-binding "soft law" instrument
which also contains broad, imprecise statements of principles. While soft law has made
important contributions to the legal and administrative framework that governs space, the
Code does not hold such promise. Instead, this article argues that the Code is a case
study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when employed as a mechanism to
regulate military activities and weapons in a highly insecure environment. Moreover, it
is notably ill-suited in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical
problem of orbital space debris. As a soft law instrument with both soft law’s general
limitations and its own particular shortcomings, the Code is an ineffective measure that
distracts attention from more meaningful initiatives to reduce orbital debris while at the
same time risking increasing tensions in space, diminishing the existing legal framework
governing space activities, and negatively affecting the future development of space law.
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Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon:
The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities
By Jack M. Beard
Part I: Introduction

Satellites and other spacecraft have quietly become an essential part of the world’s
infrastructure and now play an indispensable role in our everyday lives, empowering countless
services ranging from communications to banking, weather reports, safety functions and
navigation.1 Perhaps more ominously, however, space has also become a vital military domain as
space systems represent invaluable national security assets for the United States and other
countries.2 Space is in fact so fundamental to modern American military power that U.S. defense
officials have suggested that without space systems, “many of our most important military
advantages evaporate.”3
The militarization of space has proceeded in spite of the peaceful purposes which were
established for its exploration and use in the first legal instrument developed to govern space
activities.4 Even though states are committed to use space only for “peaceful purposes,” this
ambiguous phrase has historically been subject to competing interpretations.5 The prevailing



Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; former Associate Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs), Department of Defense. The author wishes to thank Alex Lierz and Taylor Brooks for their
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1
Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons _
and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-database.html#.VaLcwUZMJ5Y; Space Debris: Orbital
Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, UNITED NATIONS (2008), http://www.un.org/en/events/
tenstories/08/spacedebris.shtml.
2
William J. Lynn, III, [former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense], A Military Strategy for the New Space
Environment, 34 WASH. Q. 7 (Summer 2011) (“Space systems enable our modern way of war. They allow our
warfighters to strike with precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to see the
battlefield with clarity.”).
3
Id.
4
See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [the Outer Space Treaty], Preamble, opened for signature on Dec. 18,
1979, entered into force July 11, 1984, 1363 UNTS 3 (“Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”).
5
P.K. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE: A BRIEF HISTORY
WITH KEY DOCUMENTS 29, 34 (1988) (noting that interpretation of the phrase “peaceful purposes” has been a highly
controversial problem since the beginning of the space age – with one principal school of thought holding that the
phrase refers to “nonmilitary use” and the other holding that it refers to “nonaggressive use.”).

interpretation, which allows the use of space “for military purposes as long as they are not
aggressive in character,” has left space open to diverse and expanding military activities.6
Rather than a hoped-for, peaceful utopia, space thus continues to evolve into a highly
militarized, contested and dangerously insecure domain in which many states view each other’s
activities there with great suspicion and seek to counter growing, perceived threats. As U.S.
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work recently observed in announcing the creation of a new
U.S. space operations center, China and Russia “present us with unique and increasingly stressing
military challenges” and suggested that although space had once been a “virtual sanctuary,” it
must now “be considered a contested operational domain in ways that we haven’t had to think
about in the past.”7
Other countries, however, have voiced their own concerns about U.S. military activities in
space. On Oct. 17, 2014, a remote-controlled X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (dubbed a “secret space
plane”) completed a record-setting 674-day mission orbiting earth as it performed classified
missions for the U.S. Air Force.8 In spite of the secrecy surrounding the project, Pentagon
officials denied that the plane has “anything to do with space weapons.”9 Suspicious foreign
observers, especially in Russia and China, disagree. Many of them view the X-37B space plane
as a prototype of a new space weapon which may be capable of disabling or destroying satellites
and other targets in space or on earth.10
For its part, the U.S. Government consistently reaffirms its support of the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space, but also asserts its right to “prevent and deter aggression
against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security.”11 Unfortunately, it is often fear
that seems to dominate the views of potential U.S. adversaries as they assess new U.S. military
projects in space like the X-37B.12 Such fears predictably generate counter-measures by

6

Id., at 35 (noting that the Soviet Union and the United States ultimately chose to preserve discretion in the
interpretation of the term” peaceful purposes” and agreed that space “can be used for military purposes so long as
they are not aggressive in character.”).
7
Marcus Weisgerber & Patrick Tucker, Pentagon Rushing to Open Space-War Center to Counter China, Russia,
(June 23, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/06/pentagon-preparing-war-space-russiachina/116101/ (also noting that “The ugly reality that we must now all face is that if an adversary were able to take
space away from us, our ability to project decisive power across transoceanic distances and overmatch adversaries in
theaters once we get there … would be critically weakened.”).
8
Alan Yuhas, X-37B Secret Space Plane's Mission Remains Mystery Outside US Military, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27,
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/26/x37b-us-military-secret-space-plane-mission.
9
William J. Broad, Surveillance is Suspected as Main Role of Spacecraft, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/science/space/23secret.html?_r=0.
10
See, e.g., Top-secret X-37B Spacecraft Lands after Nearly Two Years in Orbit, RT (Russian News), Oct. 17, 2014,
http://rt.com/usa/196988-air-force-space-plane-lands/.
11
See National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE (2011), available at
http://www.defense.gov/home/ features/2011/0111nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassified
SummaryJan2011.pdf [hereinafter National Security Space Strategy].
12
See, e.g., Fred Weir, Can Russia Rival the X-37B Space Plane with its Own Robotic Spacecraft?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0203/Can-Russia-rival-the-X-37B-spaceplane-with-its-own-robotic-spacecraft (noting that “[m]ost Russian media coverage about the mini-shuttle [the X37B] was dominated by fear.”).
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threatened states (such as developing their own variant of the X-37B), leading in turn to the
prospect of an arms race in space.13
Fear, suspicion, perceived threats, and continuing allegations of hostile acts continue to
undermine the status of space as a secure and peaceful domain. In 2012, Russian officials
claimed that a Russian satellite had been disabled by a secret weapon, presumably operated by the
United States.14 More recently, Russia has refused to respond to inquiries regarding a
“mysterious object” launched by the Russian military which has engaged in various sophisticated
maneuvers and is described as “stoking fears over the revival of a defunct Kremlin project to
destroy satellites.”15 Meanwhile, back on earth, several states continue to employ technologies
that interfere with satellite transmissions for various political purposes.16
It is in this insecure environment that the international community now confronts a serious
and growing threat to all future uses of space, the problem of orbital space debris.17 Space debris
consists of all manner of “junk” left in space, including defunct satellites, rocket stages used in
previous launches, nose cones, payload covers, shrouds, bolts, solid propellant slag, space activity
cast-aways, deterioration fragments (peeled paint, etc.) and fragments from exploding batteries,
fuel tanks, and collisions.18 Even the smallest piece of debris, travelling at speeds of many
thousands of kilometers per hour, has the potential to damage or destroy a spacecraft or harm an
astronaut and can remain in orbit for hundreds or even thousands of years (depending on its
altitude and related orbital drag and decay).19
In an ominous development in February 2009, the first major collision of two satellites in
orbit occurred (a defunct Russian communications satellite and an operational US satellite, each
travelling at 17,500 miles an hour), creating a huge cloud of space debris that may threaten

13

See, e.g., Lewis Page, Russia has 'Secret Space Warplane to Match US X-37B, THE REGISTER, Feb. 4, 2011,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/04/x37b_ski/.
14
See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russia’s Failed Mars Probe Crashes Into Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012 (noting
a Russian space official’s speculation that the Phobos-Grunt satellite might have been hit by an ASAT weapon);
Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Official Suggests Weapon Caused Exploration Spacecraft’s Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
10, 2012 (noting the Russian allegation that US radar installations in Alaska might have damaged the Phobos-Grunt
satellite.).
15
Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E – Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 2014,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cdd0bdb6-6c27-11e4-990f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MeMsL2Nr.
16
Lynn, supra note 2, at 7-16 (noting how satellite broadcasts by the BBC and other organizations have been
disrupted by states such as Libya and Iran and that “even less technologically developed countries such as Ethiopia
have employed jamming technologies for political purposes.”).
17
Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Jan. 17, 2012) (“The long-term sustainability of our
space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors.”) [hereinafter Press Statement, Sec’y
of State Clinton], http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm.
18
On Growing Threat Of Space Debris, European Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/
Operations/Space_Debris/Focus_on_growing_threat_of_space_debris/ (noting that space is clogged with the leftovers
from the near-5000 launches by all spacefaring nations since the start of the space age); Space Debris: Orbital Debris
Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, supra note 1.
19
Space Debris: Orbital Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, supra note 1.
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orbiting spacecraft for decades.20 The junkyard of space debris orbiting earth is now so extensive
that many more collisions are expected, at an increasingly frequent rate.21
The precarious security situation in space has dramatically contributed to the threat posed
by orbiting space debris. In 2007, the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its military
capabilities and stunned the international community by conducting an anti-satellite weapon
(ASAT) test against one of its own aging weather satellites, generating a massive cloud of
orbiting space debris that now poses a collision risk to all spacecraft in or passing through low
earth orbit. 22 According to the Chief Scientist and Program Manager of the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) Orbital Debris Program Office, "This is by far the worst
satellite fragmentation in the history of the space age, in the past 50 years…Many of these debris
will be in orbit for 100 years or more because the altitude of the breakup was so high.”23
The debris-generating Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the growing threat posed by orbital
space debris prompted the international community to reexamine the existing international legal
and administrative framework that regulates military and civilian activities in outer space. This
framework is founded on two sets of authorities: “hard law” and “soft law.” The hard law space
regime consists of legally binding rules, drawn principally from a small set of multilateral
agreements (the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the
Registration Convention and the Moon Treaty) and the body of customary international law.24
Since the conclusion of the last of multilateral convention in 1979, however, the
international community has been unable to achieve any new, legally binding agreements to
govern space activities (and the most recently concluded multilateral convention, the Moon
20

Id.; William J. Broad, Debris Spews into Space after Satellites Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009 (noting that the
Russian and American communications satellites “cracked up in silent destruction” and that the American Iridium
satellite was part of a constellation of 66 spacecraft.).
21
Christian Torres, Report Says Space Debris Past ‘Tipping Point,’ NASA Needs to Step up Action, WASH. POST,
Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/reports-says-space-debris-past-tipping-pointnasa-needs-to-step-up-action/2011/08/31/gIQAo6WTuJ_story.html (further noting the possibility that if debris
reaches a “critical mass,” it could set off a chain reaction of more collisions, resulting in a cascading effect in which
debris would continually collide with one another and create even more debris.).
22
William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/asia/19china.html?; NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Fengyun-1C
Debris: Two Years Later, 13 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 2 (Jan. 2009) available at http://orbital
debris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv13i1.pdf (further noting that the Fengyun-1C debris cloud accounted for
more than 25% of all cataloged objects in Low Earth Orbit in 2008, with 400 objects still to be catalogued.).
23
Frank Morring, Jr., China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever, AVIATION WEEK, Feb 11, 2007,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1790313/posts. The orbit of a particular satellite is a function of its
mission. Most satellites in low earth orbit operate at altitudes of hundreds of kilometers up to around 1,000 km. The
lower the altitude, the greater the atmospheric drag. This drag slows a satellite and will eventually decay its orbit and
force it to fall to earth (unless the satellite has maneuvering capabilities). See DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO &
LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 29, 39-40 (2005).
24
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187;
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T.695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15;
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S.
3, 18 I.L.M. 1434.
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Treaty, has been ratified by only sixteen countries.)25 In place of legally binding agreements, a
wide variety of non-binding “soft law” instruments have been developed for space activities,
variously described as “non-binding principles, norms, standards or other statements of expected
behavior in the form of recommendations, charters, terms of reference, guidelines, codes of
conduct, etc.”26
In light of the obstacles that have prevented states from concluding legally binding
agreements to govern space activities, some authors have suggested that soft law initiatives
should be embraced “as the best hope for pragmatic progress in a highly politically charged
environment.”27 It has also been suggested that soft law has emerged as the “most appropriate
tool” for ensuring the security of space objects and preventing an arms race in space.28
The shocking, destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007 inspired the European Union to
develop a soft law instrument, a non-binding code of conduct, to promote more responsible
behavior in space.29 The European Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space was formally
proposed on December 17, 2008.30 After three subsequent revisions, the latest draft (March 31,
2014) is now referred to as the International Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space
Activities (the “ICOC” or the “Code”).31
Invoking the benefits of soft law, many scholars, government officials and other
commentators support the adoption of the Code and consider it (or similar codes) to be the right
step forward in order to ensure more responsible behavior in space.32 Toward this end, the Code
25

Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 Jan 2015, http://www.unoosa.
org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf.
26
Marco Ferrazzani, Soft Law in Space Activities – An Updated View, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION
OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 99, 100 (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012) [hereinafter SOFT LAW
IN SPACE]; Dinah L. Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L 291, 319 (2006) (noting
that the term "soft law" is often used to denote principles, standards, or arrangements of a non-legally binding
nature.).
27
See, e.g., Ben Baseley-Walker, Analyzing International Reactions to Soft Law Initiatives on Space Security, in
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 387, 394.
28
See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN
SPACE, supra note 26, at 361, 372.
29
Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 27 (Ajey Lele ed., 2012) [hereinafter DECODING
THE CODE] (“The Code was largely stimulated by the troubling display of non-transparency and insensitivity to the
space environment shown by China in its 2007 anti-satellite test.”).
30
Council of the European Union, Council conclusions and the draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities,
Annex II, ST 17175 2008 INIT (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=
EN&f=ST%2017175%202008%20INIT.
31
Council of the European Union, Version March 31, 2014, Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space
Activities, available at http://eeas.europa. eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_
conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf [hereinafter Code]. Previous revised versions were proposed on October
11, 2010, and September 16, 2013.
32
See, e.g., Park Won-hwa, Space Code of Conduct: Right Step Forward Although Not Perfect, in DECODING THE
CODE, supra note 29, at 101, 103 (describing the Code, in spite of its limitations, as a “positive milestone for
humankind”); Victoria Samson, The ICOC: A Starting Point, in AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT
ICOC FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 69 (Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014) [hereinafter
AWAITING LAUNCH] (“While the ICoC is not perfect, it is an excellent start to the conversation on what major space
stakeholders believe to be responsible use of space…”); Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 17 (“A
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employs its own soft law approach to address numerous issues, including those found in two
related but very different subject matter areas: the critical problem of orbital space debris and the
challenge of preventing an arms race in space. The Code unfortunately fails in its attempts to
achieve progress in either of these areas and instead undermines such efforts.
While various soft law instruments have made positive contributions to different aspects
of space law, this article argues that the Code does not hold such promise. On the contrary, the
Code is a case study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when employed as a mechanism to
regulate military activities and weapons in a highly insecure environment. Moreover, it is notably
ill-suited in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical problem of orbital
space debris. As an instrument with soft law’s limitations and its own particular shortcomings,
the Code is thus an ineffective and distracting measure that risks increasing tensions in space
while diminishing existing and future space regimes.
The article is organized as follows. Part II briefly discusses the ascendance of soft law as a
design choice in building international regimes and the important role that it has played in the
formation of space law and regulatory frameworks related to space activities. Next, this part
concisely reviews the Code framework, particularly as it relates to military and security concerns
and the promotion of arms control objectives.
Part III presents the argument that soft law is generally a problematic design choice for
arms control initiatives and is ill-equipped to address contentious security issues in an unstable
geopolitical environment. The argument proceeds by analyzing the negative effects of soft law
design choices that weaken instruments such as the Code along the dimensions of precision and
obligation. The impact of these design choices on compliance may also vary with respect to the
political systems that embrace them, raising questions about possible disadvantages for
democratic states (and their open societies) when they undertake in good faith to implement
politically significant but legally non-binding arms control commitments.
Part IV carries the analysis one step further, arguing that the Code is a particularly
problematic soft law variant for addressing critical space problems, notably space debris. In
advancing this argument, central features of the Code are assessed, including the manner in which
this diplomatically-driven, or “top-down” soft law instrument is layered upon current, more
effective “bottom-up” soft law initiatives, creating a counterproductive and confusing “soft-onsoft law” phenomenon. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the Code has failed to attract the
support of several key spacefaring states, raising the prospect of a fractional soft law variant that
is unable to address key security issues and instead risks increasing tensions in space.
The Code presents one last intriguing soft law predicament based on its promotion as a
“non-binding” yet “norm-creating” instrument. As a legally non-binding document, the Code
skirts legislative participation in subscribing democratic states where legislatures normally
approve, authorize or otherwise participate in the conclusion of legally binding agreements. To
the extent that the Code, along with subsequent state practice, generates new legally binding
norms of customary international law, it would thus enlarge a “democracy deficit” in the
Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by
establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space.”).

6

formation of those rules and could have far-reaching negative consequences. The Code’s
heralded non-binding yet norm-creating status has given rise to an unprecedented conflict
between the executive and legislative branches in the United States. This conflict threatens to
undermine not only U.S. support for the Code, but also the leading role that the United States has
played in the development of space law since the beginning of the space era.
Part V offers some thoughts on principles to guide states as they take the next step in
developing new instruments to better address the critical threat posed by space debris while also
grappling with separate but closely related security and arms control issues in space. Finally, Part
VI concludes with reflections on the most serious problems confronting the international
community in space and how the Code unfortunately represents more of an obstacle than a
meaningful solution to these problems.
Part II: The Ascendance of Soft Law and Its Role in Outer Space
A. Choosing Soft Law
In contrast to the protracted negotiations that are often required to conclude legally
binding agreements, the process associated with developing soft law has been described as a
faster and easier alternative for states to address shared problems and overcome political
obstacles.33 One common explanation for the ease with which states are able to conclude soft law
instruments is the flexibility afforded by a soft law, an attribute that some authors also suggest is
particularly useful for dealing with the challenges of space.34
Soft law instruments may thus enjoy the benefits of great flexibility and may be concluded
quickly through a variety of methods, particularly by employing indeterminate terms that help
avoid lengthy debates about controversial key phrases and definitions.35 Vague, ambiguous,
imprecise or otherwise indeterminate language used in international instruments is often
categorized by scholars as a form of “soft law.”36 Soft law documents may thus take many forms
as they are weakened along one or more dimensions, including obligation and precision.37
33

Christian Olarean, Cyber Threats to Space Systems: Why Cyber in Space Security?, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra
note 32, at 101, 104 (noting how non-legally binding tools and frameworks provide greater flexibility than binding
treaties and permit timely movement towards solutions on issues “where political obstacles can make the negotiation
of legal instruments a protracted process.”); Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 105 (arguing that soft law instruments
“foster international cooperation by offering simper, faster and more flexible terms.”).
34
Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117 (describing the practice of soft law as “a virtuous system that is flexible,
corresponding to the needs of the space community…”).
35
Wolfgang Rathgeber et al., Space security and the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, UNIDIR
DISARMAMENT FORUM, no. 4, 2009, at 34, available at http://www.unidir.org/files/ publications/pdfs/a-safer-spaceenvironment-en-325.pdf (noting that “because it constitutes soft law, a code of conduct is easier to agree to and
potentially avoids lengthy discussions about definitions...”).
36
Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AM. J. INT’L L 413, 414-15 n.7 (1983)
(stating that "[i] t would seem better to reserve the term 'soft law' for rules that are imprecise and not really
compelling"); Shelton, supra note 26, at 319 (noting that "[t]he term 'soft law' is also sometimes employed to refer to
the weak, vague, or poorly drafted content of a binding instrument"); Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction to
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 1, 3 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (noting that soft law
can also refer to hortatory language).
37
See R. R. Baxter, International Law in Her "Infinite Variety," 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 549 (1980) (suggesting that
"soft law" can manifest itself in an "infinite variety" of forms); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft
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Although soft law instruments are often characterized by diminished obligations (since
they are legally non-binding documents) and/or imprecise language, they may nonetheless be able
to significantly influence the behavior and conduct of states.38 Scholars who describe the benefits
of soft law point in particular to the ability of soft law instruments to help states and international
organizations build new international norms, including new norms of space law.39 Such
capabilities are also invoked by commentators who suggest that soft law initiatives should be
embraced as “a key building block for norm-setting and regulation of the outer space
environment.”)40
Advocates of the Code thus argue that one of its greatest strengths is its status as a soft
law instrument, suggesting that it “can help define responsible activities and set out agreed norms
of behaviour when legally binding agreements cannot be reached.”41 Proponents further predict
that the Code will establish a solid foundation for such progress and be able to serve as “an
essential normative instrument to harmonize the interests of space-faring and non-space-faring
countries.”42 Similarly, senior U.S. officials now posit that “the development and negotiation of a
code could play an important role in building international political consensus and understanding
around key concepts of responsible behavior.”43

Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (emphasizing that "'soft law' begins once legal
arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation").
38
Christian Brunner & Georg Konigsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ — A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law
Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 90; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1880 (2002) ("[M]any instruments that are not considered 'law' under the
classical definition have a substantial impact on the behavior of states."); Nina-Louisa Remuss, Space and Security,
in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW 519, 539 (Christian Brünner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011)
(noting that even though a code of conduct is soft law, it “can still give significant impetus to both national and
international political processes.”).
39
See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L 259, 269
(1992) (describing soft law solutions as "useful steps on a longer journey" and the point where "international law and
international politics combine to build new norms"); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and
international Relations Theory: A New Generation of lnterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L 367 (1998)
(emphasizing the advantages of nonbinding soft law in the context of international governance and the generation of
norms by supranational institutions and their dissemination by nongovernmental organizations); OGUNSOLA O.
OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 17-21 (1975) (noting how in the early space era,
some non-legally binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions were widely recognized as codifying existing key
international law principles while others paved the way for important legally binding agreements or served as a
source of customary international law based on the practice of states.).
40
See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 27, at 394.
41
See, e.g., Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New Multilateral Processes, in
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 119, 121.
42
Jessica Los Banos, EU Code of Conduct on Activities in Outer Space: Issues that Matter, in DECODING THE CODE,
supra note 29, at 97, 100; See also Olarean, supra note 33, at 104 (noting that “non-binding tools can be used as a
mechanism for harmonising national laws and practices, allowing states to move towards adherence, while keeping
within their economic and technological capacities.”).
43
Gregory L. Schulte [U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space Policy] & Audrey M. Schaffer, [U.S. Space
Policy Advisor in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy] Enhancing Security by Promoting
Responsible Behavior in Space, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q., no. 1, at 9, 14 (2012).
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B. The Legal Significance of Soft Law
So-called norms and standards of responsible behavior which are set forth in soft law
instruments are, by definition, not legally binding.44 Yet soft law principles may nonetheless
ultimately have legal significance through a variety of processes.
First, soft law principles may assist in the interpretation and application of existing space
law treaties and other obligations.45 For example, Article XII of the 1972 Liability Convention
provides that compensation to be paid by a launching state for damages caused by space objects,
including damages caused by space objects “carrying a nuclear power source on board,” shall be
“determined in accordance with international law and principles of justice and equity…”46 The
text of the Liability Convention, however, is unclear whether such compensation includes
reimbursement of expenses incurred for search, recovery and cleanup operations.47
In order to assist in the interpretation of language in legally binding agreements, including
Article XII of the Liability Convention, states may make recourse under Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties to “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”48 In the case of the
Liability Convention, such subsequent practice can be found in Principle 9.3 of the non-legally
binding 1992 Declaration of Principles relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space,
which provides that compensation for damage caused by space objects or their component parts
“shall include reimbursement of the duly substantiated expenses for search, recovery and cleanup
operations…”49 Although this specification of reimbursable expenses is contained in a soft law
instrument, the fact that the instrument had been adopted by all the states parties to the Liability
Convention “can be regarded as an expression of subsequent practice in the application of the
Convention,” making it an authoritative basis for interpreting the Convention.50
Second, soft law instruments setting forth various technical standards, guidelines or
regulations may create obligations of a procedural nature.51 Although these technical standards,
guidelines and regulations lack legally binding force, they nonetheless may have “factual

44

Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116 (referring to these non-binding principles as “light norms.”).
Id.; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, AM. J. INT’L L 901, 914 (2003) (noting the impact of soft law on
the interpretation of treaties and on the establishment of customary international law in areas such as human rights).
46
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 187.
47
Faustino Pocar, The Normative Role of UNCOPUOS, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS:
ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 415, 420 (Daphné Crowther &
Gabriel Lafferranderie eds., 1997).
48
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31.3.b.
49
Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, Principle 9.3, 23 I.L.M. 917 (1992);
Recommended to U.N. GADR, 47th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/47/20 (1992).
50
Pocar, supra note 47, at 420 (further noting that declarations of principles on outer space adopted by the General
Assembly “play a significant role within treaty law, despite their non-binding nature, as far as they contribute to
clarify the scope of rights and obligations expressed in treaties and conventions.).
51
Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116.
45
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effects.”52 For example, with respect to the regulation of satellite networks, the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) issues numerous recommendations and other decisions which
are non-binding, but states may find themselves forced to comply with these recommendations
and decisions “due to pure necessity of compliance.”53 Non-compliance could in fact “lead to
severe consequences up to complete isolation from the telecommunications world due to nonmatching standards or outdated equipment.”54 (ITU recommendations and regulations also help
to illustrate the first point noted above, since they have enjoyed legal significance when employed
as supplementary means of interpretation by arbitral tribunals and other adjudicating bodies,
including World Trade Organization adjudicating bodies.)55
Third, soft law instruments setting forth various technical standards, guidelines or
regulations can lead to harmonized international procedural standards that in turn may generate
legally binding domestic legislation and regulations (including domestic licensing requirements
and other administrative procedures).56 In the area of space law, such soft law procedural
initiatives have clearly served as an incentive for states to create coordinated national space
legislation and regulations.57 For example, the 1986 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on
“Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” has played such a role.58
Although this resolution is non-binding, its principles are widely accepted and have been
incorporated in the legally binding domestic licensing regulations of numerous states.59 They are
thus recognized, for the most part, as international obligations in the U.S. space regulatory
regime, which requires those persons licensed to operate any private remote-sensing space system
to comply with key principles set forth in the resolution.60

52

Christian Brünner & George Kőnigsberger, Regulatory Impact Assessment – A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law
Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 87, 89 (further noting that “the decisive factor is not the form
of regulation, but the ‘substance’ and the intention to regulate and influence behavior and conduct.”).
53
Jens Hinricher, The Law-Making of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) - Providing a New Source of
International Law?, 64 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L L. 489, 499, 501 (2004) (further noting that because of the
complicated underlying technical issues and the ITU’s general reputation for expertise and accuracy, the “nonbinding decisions of the ITU are commonly accepted by its members as if they were binding.”).
54
Id., at 499.
55
Yusuf Aksar, International Economic Law, in IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 1, 41-42 (Yusuf Aksar ed., 2011) (“Regulations and recommendations of the
ITU are among the best fitting soft law instruments in international law.”).
56
Setsuko Aoki, The Function of ‘Soft Law’ in the Development of International Space Law, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE,
supra note 26, at 57, 63 (noting that the “subcategory” of “soft law for the harmonization of national laws” includes
“the tacit understanding…that soft law should remain as a standard for the elaboration of national law.”).
57
Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117.
58
Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, U.N Doc. A/RES/41/65 (1986).
59
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, 3
(2012), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-brief-overview-of-norms-development-in-outer-space-en462.pdf (“The Remote Sensing Principles have also been incorporated into numerous national, regional, and
multilateral laws and policies, including those of France, Japan, India, Thailand, and the United States of America.”).
60
Michael Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer
Space, 50 A.F.L. REV. 253, 263-264 (2001). Under U.S. law, no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may directly or
indirectly operate any private remote-sensing space system without first obtaining the appropriate license from the
Department of Commerce. 15 CFR 5601; see also, JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE
LEGISLATION 96 (2004).
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Fourth, soft law instruments seeking to frame new norms of cooperation may later form
the basis of legally binding international agreements.61 This phenomenon was notably
demonstrated in the early era of space exploration when several key principles set forth in nonbinding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions were subsequently codified in legally binding
multilateral agreements governing activities in space.62 For example, the foundational “nonappropriation principle,” barring states from claiming sovereignty over outer space and celestial
bodies, was first expressed in a U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1961 and subsequently
formed the basis of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.63
Fifth, specific provisions in a soft law instrument may eventually crystallize into rules of
customary international law.64 Several U.N. General Assembly resolutions conspicuously served
this purpose early in the space era.65 Widely accepted non-binding technical standards, guidelines
and other regulations, such as ITU decisions and recommendations, may also be cited as evidence
of general state practice, helping to potentially shape and form rules of customary international
law.66 Soft law’s role in sometimes contributing to the formation of customary international law
has thus been an important factor in the development of space law and proponents of the Code
point to the likelihood (in their view) of provisions in the Code eventually becoming binding rules
of customary international law.67

61

Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116-117 (noting how soft law may help in “the process of early elaboration of detailed
obligations to be subsequently formalized under the law of international agreements.”).
62
OGUNBANWO, supra note 39, at 17-21.
63
U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1721 (A) (XVI) on International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Space
(1961); Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance to the International
Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 9, 26 (further noting that the nonappropriation principle may have achieved the status of a rule of customary international law even before the
adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1721 and the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty).
64
Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 850, 857; see also Freeland, supra note 62, at 26 (also noting that soft law provisions “may even be
declaratory of customary international law in certain circumstances”).
65
Vereshchetin & Danilenko, infra note 285, at 25 (noting that “the acceleration of the formation of customary
principles relating to outer space was brought about not only by the fact that all actions of states in the field of
exploration and use of outer space were immediately known all over the world, but also by the adoption of a number
of United Nations General Assembly resolutions.”). It should be noted, however, that the U.N. General Assembly
has the power only to “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter, art. X. In order
to form the basis of customary international law, such resolutions must purport to state legal principles, enjoy a very
high degree of consensus, and be reflected in the subsequent general practice of states acting out of a sense of legal
obligation. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §103 (observing that resolutions of universal
organizations, “if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight” in
the identification of international law); §103 Reporters Note 2 (observing that “even a unanimous resolution may be
questioned when the record shows that those voting for it considered it merely a recommendation or a political
expression, or that serious consideration was not given to its legal basis. A resolution is entitled to little weight if it is
contradicted by state practice…”).
66
Hinricher, supra note 53, at 499-501 (noting that the ITU is involved “in reshaping and supplementing international
law” and that “the overall compliance of states with non-binding recommendations issued by international
organisations such as the ITU can …slowly evolve into binding customary rules and practices.”).
67
Remuss, supra note 38, at 539; Los Banos, supra note 42, at 100 (arguing that the Code “will lay the groundwork
to transform commitments into legally binding obligations either through the enactment of a treaty or their
crystallization into customary international law in the future.”).
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Each legally significant process and aspect of soft law has been reflected in important
ways in the development of the legal framework that now governs activities in space. Soft law is
thus a long established, vital component of the space law regime and there is an increasing
tendency of the international community to rely on soft law instruments to assist in numerous
areas of space activity.68 It should be noted, however, that not all soft law instruments lead to the
formation of new rules of customary international law or serve as the basis for new legal regimes.
In some cases, these instruments may be illusory achievements, presenting “only the appearance
of genuine agreement and shared understanding, when in fact there is none.”69 In addressing arms
control and security issues, these instruments may also create their own problems, thus causing
more harm than good (as discussed below).
C. Soft Law as the Proposed Solution for Space: The Code
In recent years, several diplomatically-driven soft law initiatives related to space activities
have received considerable attention at the United Nations. For example, since 2005, the U.N.
General Assembly has promoted the development and adoption of so-called “Outer Space
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures” (TCBMs).70 As part of these efforts, a
Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) was formed in 2011 with the mandate “to conduct…a
study on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures” and submit a final report to
the General Assembly.71 In late 2013, the General Assembly received and endorsed the final
GGE report and encouraged U.N. Member States to review and implement the proposed soft law
measures through relevant national mechanisms on a voluntary basis.72
The EU’s development of an international code of conduct for outer space is not directly
related to GGE activities,73 although the Code does contain several voluntary TCBMs similar to
those recommended by the GGE in its final report. These include provisions encouraging states
to endeavor to organize the following activities on a voluntary basis: familiarization visits to
improve understanding of a state's policies and procedures for outer space activities; expert visits
to space launch sites, flight control centers, and other outer space infrastructure facilities;
observations of launches of space objects; demonstrations of rocket and other space-related
68

Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117 (“Whatever the history of space law may tell, soft law is already there, nonlegally binding but vital, helping significantly in the establishment and development of international space
relations”); Freeland, supra note 63, at 25-26 (“There is a clear trend towards the use of such [soft law] instruments,
continuing the long-established understanding that soft law is a well-accepted methodology for
furthering…endeavors in outer space.”).
69
RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 38 38 (1981) (noting how
commentators have observed that some soft law techniques, such as the employment of equivocal or ambiguous
language, may result in agreements that are “wholly illusory and not useful.”).
70
Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions promoting TCBMs. These efforts have
enjoyed the strong support of many governments, particularly the Russian Federation. See Department of Security
Affairs and Disarmament & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Approaches towards
Ensuring Security in Space, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 29, at 117.
71
G.A. Res. A/65/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/68 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/68.
72
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, G.A. Res. 68/50, U.N. Doc
A/RES/68/50 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/RES/68/50.
73
Although the General Assembly resolution endorsing the final GGE report explicitly recognized “the presentation
by the European Union of a draft of a non-legally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities,”
the Code has proceeded on a sometimes parallel -- but separate – track. Id., at ¶2.
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technologies; dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and, thematic workshops
and conferences on the exploration and use of outer space.74
The Code, however, contains more than just traditional TCBMs like those recommended
by the U.N. General Assembly. The latest draft of the Code is subdivided into four sections (Core
Principles and Objectives, General Measures, Cooperation Mechanisms, and Organizational
Aspects) and its stated purpose is “to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of all outer
space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space environment.”75 To achieve these
goals, states subscribing to the Code resolve to perform a variety of actions, including notifying
other subscribing states of designated space activities (without distinction as to their military or
civilian nature), including pre-notification of the launch of space objects and scheduled
maneuvers that could pose a risk to the safety of flight of the space objects of other States.76
States further resolve, pursuant to the Code, to annually share information with the other
subscribing states related to their “space strategies and policies, including those which are
security-related, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and sustainability in outer
space” as well as their “major outer space research and space applications programmes.”77 Good
faith efforts to fully implement such provisions on notification and sharing of information may
raise serious issues for the military agencies of some spacefaring countries, particularly with
respect to divulging information relating to their sensitive technology and national security.78
Other provisions in the Code, which could be interpreted to restrict specific military
activities and programs, raise additional national security concerns for some states. For example,
the Code contains five different provisions related to a subscribing state’s responsibility to
prevent “harmful interference” to another state’s space activities and objects, including section 4.1
in which subscribing states “resolve to establish and implement policies and procedures to
minimize...any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of
outer space.”79
The Code, however, does not define the broad term “harmful interference,” (which could
encompass diverse types of actions causing direct, indirect, or temporary effects), nor does it
make any distinction between military and civilian activities that might cause such harmful
interference. While the elusive, undefined term harmful interference is found in several
agreements relating to space, it is used in those agreements in much more limited contexts than as
a comprehensive prohibition of all forms of harmful interference with space objects.80
74

Id., art. 6.4.
CODE, supra note 31, art. 1.1. Art. 1.2 further provides that “[t]his Code establishes transparency and confidencebuilding measures, with the aim of enhancing mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation
and foster national, regional and global security and stability…”
76
Id., Sec. 5.1.
77
Id., Sec. 6.1.
78
Ajey Lele, Deliberating the Space Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 29, at 13, 20 (“No state
would like to share technical information which could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its
scientific and technological capabilities.”).
79
CODE, supra note 31, Sec. 2. (¶¶ 25 and 27), 4.1, 6.1 and 7.1.
80
See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX (authorizing a state party to request consultation when there is
reason to believe that the activity of another state party or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference
with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space); see also David A. Koplow, An Inference About
75
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The absence of any definitions of key terms in the Code (including the term harmful
interference) is recognized even by proponents of the Code as a significant failure.81 Critics of
the Code (including numerous members of the U.S. Congress) argue that good faith efforts to
fully implement its broad terms could have far-reaching negative consequences for U.S. military
and intelligence activities and programs in space.82
Several countries have questioned whether the Code is an appropriate mechanism to
address the military aspects of outer space, an area which has traditionally been reserved for
deliberations by the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (the CD) and its Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process.83 Russia in particular has sought to distance the proposed
Code from the PAROS process and has refrained from supporting the Code, preferring instead its
own proposed legally-binding international agreement (submitted jointly with the government
People’s Republic of China to the CD), entitled the “Draft Treaty on the Prevention on the
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (the PPWT).84
The relevance of the Code to military activities in space is nonetheless clear, having been
originally developed, as noted, in response to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.85 Although the Code
Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J.
INT’L L. 737, 781-793, 815 (2014) (cataloguing agreements that contain references to interference and noting in
particular how various defunct and extant U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control treaties contain provisions that prohibit
interference with “National Technical Means” or “NTM” spy satellites which are used to verify compliance with
treaty commitments.) Although Professor Koplow propounds a thesis that a test or use in space of a debris-creating
ASAT would be illegal under existing international law because it would result in a dangerous, persistent debris
stream that would, at some point, “impermissibly interfere with the operation of treaty-protected NTM satellites,” he
notes that at this time “there are simply not enough treaties containing the explicit NTM provisions to create [on that
basis alone] a truly comprehensive, global restriction on ASAT activities.”
81
See Tronchetti, supra note 28, at 361, 377 (while viewing the Code as a step in the right direction, the author notes
that the absence of any definition of key terms is a “negative aspect” of the Code, one which “may lead to
uncertainties in the interpretation and application of its provisions.”).
82
Letter from Thirty-Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author)
(describing the Code as a “multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for
sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise…”)).
83
Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note
32, at 45, 49 (“…a number of countries question the prerogative of this Code to deal with the military aspects of outer
space, an area that has traditionally been reserved to the CD [Conference on Disarmament].”). Since the CD
established the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS (now defunct) in 1985, arms control initiatives have been a regular
feature of CD discussions, although a common approach regarding a legally binding PAROS instrument has been not
been achieved. See Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space, 6, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-conference-on-disarmament
-and-the-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-370.pdf.
84
See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra note 70, at 118 (noting how Russia has insisted on
differentiating between the subject matter and legal basis of the PPWT and Code, and has argued that the drafting of
the Code “must not undermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT.”). The first draft of the PPWT was
proposed on Feb. 29, 2008. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1839, Feb. 29, 2008,
http://www.cfr.org/ content/publications/attachments/PPWT.pdf. The latest draft PPWT was proposed on Sept. 3,
2015. See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force
against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1985, June 12, 2014, Art. I.b, http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/G14/050/ 66/PDF/G1405066.pdf?OpenElement.
85
Kazuto Suzuki, ICoC and the Right of Self Defense, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 87, 90 (“…the ICoC
was developed as a response to the Chinese ASAT test in 2007. The ASAT test created a large cloud of space debris
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is not stylized as an arms control initiative and does not explicitly prohibit any military
technologies in space, it nonetheless is designed to be a “comprehensive” proposal which is
intended “to establish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and military
domains of outer space.”86 The text of the Code notes “the importance of preventing an arms race
in outer space” and “the responsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, civil, commercial
and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the benefit,
and in the interest, of humankind and to take all appropriate measures to prevent outer space from
becoming an arena of conflict.”87
In spite of the limitations of soft law, numerous commentators argue that the Code, as a
soft law initiative, is the “first step towards addressing the global security concerns caused by our
increased presence in outer space.”88 A similar, favorable view of a non-binding code of conduct
for outer space activities is also generally reflected in current U.S. Department of Defense
policies. For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs noted in 2012 that
the European Union’s draft plan was “a promising basis for an international code,” and that “[a]n
international code of conduct can enhance U.S. national security by encouraging responsible
space behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.”89
Soft law is not, however, a panacea for the problems of space, particularly those related to
security. As discussed below, soft law instruments have fundamental limitations in addressing
security matters, particularly in unstable geopolitical environments, and instead risk increasing
tensions and undermining meaningful legal constraints.
Part III: Soft Law: A Problematic Design Choice for Arms Control Initiatives
A. The Challenges of Arms Control
The concept of arms control encompasses a wide variety of measures that rival states may
undertake to achieve diverse objectives, including: mutually reducing levels of armaments;
eliminating entire classes of weapon systems; restricting or regulating military activities which
increase the risk of accidents or conflict; increasing predictability in relations between hostile

that would increase the risk of collision with their space assets. This sort of intentional creation of debris for any
purpose was unacceptable for many countries.”).
86
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras, Preface to AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 1 (“The ICoC is
a comprehensive proposal, trying to establish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and
military domains of outer space.”); CODE, supra note 31, Preamble, ¶13 (“[r]ecognizing the necessity of a
comprehensive approach to safety, security, and sustainability in outer space…”).
87
CODE, supra note 31, Preamble ¶6 and art. 2 (emphasis added).
88
Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New Multilateral Processes, in
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 119, 120 (further noting that the ICoC is “an example of a recent trend in
security policies, to move beyond deadlocked forums and traditional framing of problems, to encouraging creative
thinking and alternative methods of moving forward.”).
89
Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space, DOD NEWS, Jan. 18, 2012,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66833; DOD Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer
Space Activities, 2011, DEFENSE.GOV, http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111
_nsss/docs/DoD%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20International%20Code%20%208-18-11.pdf (last visited July 13, 2015)
(stating that “[a]n international Code of Conduct can enhance U.S. national security.”).
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states; reducing fears about the intentions of potential adversaries, and; pre-empting the
development or deployment of new types of weapons.90
Varied bilateral and multilateral instruments which are intended to serve as arms control
measures between adversary states must, however, overcome many hurdles to be established and
face severe challenges in functioning effectively. This is particularly true in the domain of space,
where conditions encouraging an arms race abound. Fears, suspicions and accusations about new
space weapon systems and military space projects continue to multiply, as evidenced particularly
by the growing concerns expressed by Russia and China on the one hand, and by America on the
other, about their respective space programs.
Such fears and suspicions can contribute to the classic “security dilemma,” in which
actions taken by a state intended to be defensive in nature are instead perceived by other states as
aggressive or threatening, producing unintended and undesired consequences.91 Arms races are
“only the most obvious manifestation” of the resulting “downward spiral” of these
misperceptions.92 Predictable and yet unnecessary counter-measures may thus be taken by
“threatened” states (for example, as U.S. rivals develop their own varied responses to a
spaceplane like the X-37B), causing further insecurity and fueling more dangerous and expensive
arms races in space.93
The classic security dilemma is made even more acute in space because a state may feel
threatened by an adversary’s development and deployment of technologies that are dual-use in
nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses.94 The
abundance of dual-use technologies in space may thus further obscure an adversary's real
intentions and make it even more difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures
(and the possibility that new, devastating military advantages have been achieved).
In this extremely challenging space environment, one which is characterized by high risk
and great insecurity, states struggle to achieve arms control agreements and other collaborative
security measures. Because the stakes in international politics are typically so high (implicating a
state’s survival or extinction), the fear of exploitation is likely to motivate a state to follow its
“dominant strategy,” i.e., cheating or defecting, in the absence of any genuine collaborative
agreement.95 It is thus not surprising that arms control agreements are “highly institutionalized,”
with implementing regimes that “are continually concerned with compliance and policing,” and
“specify verification and monitoring procedures.”96
90

JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 11 (2002).
ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 66 (1976) (further quoting Herbert
Butterfield as positing that the security dilemma is an “absolute predicament” that “lies in the very geometry of
human conflict.”).
92
Id.
93
Id; US X-37B Spurs China to Seek Countermeasures: Russian Expert, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id...cid=1101.
94
JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE 12 (2014) (noting that an
“essential fact” of space technology is “its dual-use nature.”).
95
ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40
(1993) (further describing arms control agreements as “notoriously problematic.”).
96
Id.
91
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For example, the START I Treaty97 established an elaborate and effective verification
regime which allowed the parties to remain confident in each other’s compliance with obligations
related to the reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.98 The regime provided
numerous methods (including mandatory on-site inspections) for the parties to gather and confirm
needed information about the other party’s treaty-limited forces.99 It also prohibited each party
from interfering with the other party’s treaty-related surveillance and monitoring capabilities, socalled “National Technical Means” (principally spy satellites), and established the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission for the discussion of treaty implementation issues and
compliance questions.100
While verification, monitoring, compliance and policing activities are routinely associated
with effective arms control regimes, all these features depend on an even more fundamental,
underlying attribute: the nature of the commitment. The nature of commitments in international
instruments may, however, be dramatically altered by soft law design choices.
A common virtue often attributed to soft law instruments is the ease with which states are
able to conclude them (compared with the lengthier and more difficult process associated with
hard law agreements). In negotiating the design of international instruments, states may consider
numerous “systemic trade-offs” in substance, structure and obligation.101 The results of these
trade-offs are different types of instruments which display varying degrees of effectiveness and
display different levels of difficulty to achieve.
States may choose to employ soft law design elements (such as weakening precision
and/or obligation) for many reasons.102 In making this choice, however, states may also delay,
sacrifice or even impede meaningful progress on the issues of mutual concern which are
addressed in soft law instruments.
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B. Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Precision
One important soft law design choice in constructing many international instruments is the
decision to employ vague, imprecise, ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language.
Indeterminate language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of international
cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms control regimes. The requirements typically
associated with arms control regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define cheating
quite explicitly.”103 There are fundamental reasons for this requirement.
A state contemplating foregoing the development and deployment of new weapon systems
in favor of pursuing international cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not
part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization. Such a collaborative regime “must
specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be
assured of its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”104 The dilemma of common interests
in this scenario, against the backdrop of perceived security threats, is often modeled in game
theory as a prisoners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to cheat (even if
all actors would actually prefer arms control or disarmament over a spiraling arms race).105
It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue that the obligations in an
arms control regime must be sufficiently precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.106
Elaborate monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such a regime have little
value without clear obligations and the ability to recognize cheating. Precision in individual
commitments, as well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal principles,
framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and argument,” also assist by discouraging states
from engaging in “auto-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their
obligations.107
The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives rise to indeterminate
normative standards, thus makes it harder for states to know what conformity is expected and also
makes it easier for states to justify noncompliance.108 Conversely, the lack of precision may also
result in uncertainty and tension as some states attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations
of ambiguous terms. To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms control, a nation is
103
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likely to “seek to describe the performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as
possible in the agreement.”109 Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements with the Soviet
Union, the United States “opted for increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they
reduce interpretative leeway.”110
Key undefined terms in the Code, particularly the critical prohibition on “harmful
interference with space objects,” serve as examples of the difficulties associated with using
imprecise language to regulate military, intelligence and security activities. Similarly, provisions
requiring the exchange of information related to a state’s “major outer space research and space
applications programmes” are undefined and problematic when broadly applied to these
activities.111
With respect to efforts to discern the meaning of ambiguous language in instruments like
the Code, it is also important to note that non-legally binding, political commitments do not
benefit from the recognized legal modes of discourse that govern the interpretation of terms in
legally binding international agreements (particularly through the application of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).112 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a
comprehensive framework of rules for the observance, operation, application and interpretation of
legally binding agreements, as well as rules governing their conclusion, entry into force,
amendment, invalidity, termination and suspension. Specific provisions in the Vienna
Convention address all aspects of the interpretation of legally binding agreements, including rules
for determining the meaning of language which remains ambiguous after the application of other
provisions specifying the context, materials and subsequent practice of the parties to be
examined.113 No such rules exist under international law for resolving disputes regarding the
interpretation of ambiguous language in soft law instruments.
The impact of broad and ambiguous terms, particularly on regime compliance by states,
should not be underemphasized.114 The uncertainties that indeterminate language generates in the
field of arms control presents its own dangerous risks, since (as discussed above), states rely on
precise language in arms control agreements for specific purposes and fundamental reasons. The
broad and vague language found in the Code, which will be subject to varied interpretations by
states, may thus “generate more, rather than less, tension in space.”115
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In contrast to the uncertainty and non-compliance associated with imprecise rules, it is
argued that “greater clarity conduces to compliance.”116 For example, in reviewing numerous
agreements with a high degree of specificity, Thomas Franck observed that “the high degree of
textual determinacy goes together with a high degree of rule-conforming state behavior.”117
Determinacy in such agreements appears to have its own “compliance pull,” while the absence of
determinacy in other agreements makes it unlikely that states will have compunctions about noncompliance.118 Rule-conforming state behavior is thus enhanced by a rule’s determinacy, which
in turn “depends upon the clarity with which it is able to communicate its intent and to shape that
intent into a specific situational command.”119
Clear and determinate rules, accompanied by rule-conforming state practice, may
ultimately give rise to legally binding rules in customary international law and may also lay the
foundation for legally binding conventions.120 However, the indeterminate language used in the
Code provides neither clear rules nor a sound basis for developing a legally binding regime.121
Instead, such language appears to merely mask a failure by states to agree on key terms and
definitions. It reflects their decision, one that is often made by diplomats in contentious
negotiations, to paper over their differences in order to achieve what is sometimes referred to as
“constructive ambiguity.”122 Rather than representing a meaningful meeting of the minds, some
scholars suggest that such language merely represents a type of “deferred confrontation.”123 In
the context of arms control, instruments which largely reflect the results of deferred confrontation
are neither reliable documents on which to build legal regimes, nor do they provide assurances of
any state’s compliance with regime objectives.
116
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In an insecure environment in which states confront evolving threats from complex
military technologies and seek to establish arms control regimes, scholars applying game theory
suggest that defensive defections from regimes by states may be avoided by relying on both
verification measures and on a “strategy of assurance.”124 Assurance devices help a state give
other states confidence in its own cooperation and compliance, with the aim of permitting each
state party to adhere to the mutually preferred cooperative course of action.125 A state may thus
provide other states with various types of information about its own compliance as an assurance
device in arms control scenarios where the benefits of cooperation are great, but the potential for
cheating is also great and the costs of opportunism and misplaced trust are high. In this situation,
“hard legal commitments” can serve as critical assurance devices.126
The type of commitment that states communicate or signal to each other in an arms
control regime is fundamentally important. Commitments made by states and intended as
assurance devices can only be effective if they are made in a credible fashion.127 Such “credible
commitments” are crucial in many aspects of contracting theory, game theory and in high-stakes
arms control scenarios when one party relies on the future performance by others while it
complies with its own side of the bargain.128
Efforts by states to make credible commitments to other states are fundamentally
undermined when the legitimacy of those commitments is diminished by textual indeterminacy.129
A rule cannot be legitimate if it cannot communicate “what conduct is permitted and what
conduct is out of bounds.”130 Although states may choose to not employ precise terms and take
an easier, more flexible soft law approach by adopting an instrument containing indeterminate
language (as in the case of the proposed Code), such indeterminacy has costs which are “paid for
in the coin of legitimacy.”131
Even when legally binding agreements are employed for arms control and disarmament
initiatives (as opposed to soft, voluntary, non-binding arrangements), key indeterminate language
in those agreements can undermine their ability to communicate credible commitments or provide
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security assurances.132 Each state may possess strong incentives for surprise defection from an
arms control agreement while at the same time risking great damage to its own national security if
a defection by another state occurs. In such situations, a state may seek to maintain its own
flexibility while attempting to ensure that other states are bound by arms limits.133
While soft law may lay the foundation for the development of hard law regimes in other
fields, in the context of arms control it may instead merely generate new sources of uncertainty
and conflict. When indeterminate language is used to establish key rules in arms control
agreements, no credible commitments are signaled by states. Concurrently, offensive defections
may be hard to identify, little assurance is signaled to prevent states from engaging in defensive
defections, and some states may become “defensive quasi-defectors” as they unilaterally interpret
(in a self-serving manner) ambiguous key rules.134
C. Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Obligation
Credible commitments in arms control regimes can be communicated or signaled along
several “hard” dimensions. Precision is only one of these dimensions, one which can be
diminished (as discussed above) by indeterminate language. The realm of soft law also includes
international arrangements in which the obligation itself is weakened by an instrument’s reduction
to a legally non-binding status. This dimension of soft law relates to the ability of a legitimate
rule in an agreement to communicate not only content, but also authority.135 Legally binding
norms thus stimulate a sense of obligation, create a compliance pull, and derive legitimacy not
only from their form but also from the process whereby these norms are created.136
By entering into legally binding agreements, states can raise the credibility of their
commitments by staking their “national reputation on adherence” and signaling their intentions
“with special intensity and gravity.”137 Such commitments serve key functions in arms control
regimes, making it possible for states to provide assurances to each other to restrain defensive
defections. As an “ex ante sorting device,” such hard legal commitments allow genuinely
committed states to identify themselves as being willing to bear the greater costs imposed on
violators of binding legal agreements, thus demonstrating a low propensity to defect.138
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One aspect of many types of legally binding agreements that has special significance for
signaling a credible commitment and communicating authority is the formal ratification or other
approval of such agreements by the legislative body of a state. Each country determines its own
internal procedures for expressing its consent to be legally bound by international agreements,
including what role (if any) is assigned to the national legislative body of that country. While the
words “treaty” and “international agreement” are synonymous terms for legally binding
agreements as a matter of international law,139 in the United States the word “treaty” has a
narrower meaning which usually refers to only those legally binding international agreements
which require the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.140
The process of legislative approval in the United States can also be accomplished by
“congressional-executive agreements,” i.e., agreements authorized in advance or subsequently
approved by a majority vote of each house of Congress.141 The president may also enter into
“sole executive agreements,” i.e., agreements made pursuant to the President’s constitutional
authority without further congressional authorization.142 The U.S. Supreme Court has
consistently recognized the validity of properly concluded, legally binding “executive
agreements.” 143 In practice, however, such findings may be aided or supported by the implied
approval of Congress.144
Whether a treaty or executive agreement is employed, both types of agreements result in
binding obligations for the United States under international law, with concurrent credibility and
assurance benefits for purposes of arms control regimes. Both approaches should be
distinguished, however, from the proposed Code, which will not constitute a legally binding
agreement. While non-binding arrangements are often closely associated only with the
139
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government in power at the time such arrangements are signed, legally binding agreements ensure
that states remain bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda so that even if new governments
come to power, they “must perform the obligations entered into by a previous regime.”145
In assessing the types of instruments that states may employ to make international
commitments, it is widely acknowledged that “the treaty regime makes the government’s
commitment more credible.”146 Similarly, other types of legally binding agreements which
involve legislative approval, such as Congressional-Executive Agreements found in the U.S. legal
system, involve credible commitments similar to those signaled in the treaty-making process. In
general, countries with more difficult treaty-making processes tend to employ those processes less
frequently (and thus conclude fewer treaties), but the commitments in those treaties are more
credible because “the cost of legislative involvement itself communicates information about the
probabilities of compliance.”147 Furthermore, in light of the power that legislatures have in
democracies to frustrate the implementation of international agreements, the structures and
processes of treaty-making (involving institutionalized legislative participation) have often been
used as a signal to communicate and reinforce the credibility of commitments to foreign
countries.148
The executive leader of a state may also choose to utilize the legislative consent process in
making an international commitment in order to send a more credible signal about that leader’s
degree of commitment to the treaty.149 Because legislatures have the ability to prevent the
implementation of agreements through the democratic process, other states may have doubts
about the ability of the executive branch to actually fulfill a commitment without legislative
approval or acquiescence.150 Just as indeterminacy undermines credible commitments with costs
paid in legitimacy, the advantages of non-legal arrangements (easier and quicker negotiation, etc.)
come with costs paid in “a reduction of the information and commitment benefits that flow from
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legislative participation…”151
For their part, the legislatures of liberal democracies may view some matters as so serious
and involving such high stakes that they see legislative participation as necessary to convey the
most formal, legally binding and credible commitment to foreign states (with the expectation of
receiving a similar, formal, reciprocal commitment from that foreign state). Arms control matters
clearly raise such concerns in the United States. For example, Congress enacted a law in 1961
which continues to provide that “[n]o action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other
Act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the
United States in a militarily significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the
President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless authorized by the
enactment of further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.”152
Regardless of the manner in which they are approved or ratified, legally binding
international agreements possess various benefits of legalization that further contribute to
signaling a credible commitment.153 In spite of the perceived advantages of non-legally binding
political instruments, they lack these benefits of legalization.
Unlike the political content of non-binding documents, legalization in international
agreements can perform a “channeling function” by conveying the seriousness of a state’s intent
to be bound, signaling at the outset a lower probability of future violations (than would be present
without legalization).154 As discussed above, legal rules are also perceived as having their own
compliance pull, are less inclined to be diminished by auto-interpretation, and benefit from “a
special set of expectations about how the agreement will be interpreted, understood, and
enforced” by virtue of the existence of a formal law of treaties as codified in the Vienna
Convention.155
In the case of arms control agreements, “hard legalization,” i.e., the strengthening of such
instruments across the dimensions of both precision and obligation, increases the credibility of
commitments and serves a particularly key function when detection of non-compliance in some
151
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arms control regimes is hard to detect.156 The Code possesses none of these hard law attributes or
advantages. The vague provisions of the Code also do not provide a basis for successfully
generating new, legally binding rules of customary international law that would be useful for an
arms control regime (or any other regime).157
Legalization plays an important and beneficial role in many areas of international
cooperation and serves a particularly crucial function in the insecure environment of military
competition and arms control. It is thus not surprising that even commentators who support the
Code nonetheless admit that a hard law approach is the “first and best choice” for regulating the
subject matter to be addressed by the Code.158 Along similar lines, a debate continues among
space law experts over the question of whether the Code is a distraction from more meaningful
international efforts to conclude legally binding agreements to govern critical space activities.159
Many proponents of the Code suggest that even if the negotiation and conclusion of a
legally binding agreement would clearly be preferable to a soft law approach, in the interim a soft
law instrument would positively contribute to the management of the outer space environment.160
Yet, as discussed above, soft law instruments such as the proposed Code are particularly
ineffective mechanisms in the high-stakes arena of arms control and may instead burden states
with a new set of uncertainties, thus risking greater insecurity and more tension in the volatile
domain of space – while also making the development of new hard law rules for space activities
less, not more, likely.161
D. Soft Law, Arms Control, and the Democracy Disadvantage
Although proponents of soft law point to the benefits and advantages of soft law, these
benefits and advantages may not fall evenly on all states undertaking arms control commitments
in soft law instruments. Soft law instruments do not contain legally binding obligations, but they
can and often do convey political commitments by states. As voluntary, political undertakings,
such documents permit all participating states the same opportunity to follow or not follow
established principles without violating any legal obligations. The practical and political impact,
156
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however, on liberal democracies that stray (or appear to stray) from such principles may be much
different than the consequences for non-liberal or authoritarian regimes that engage in similar
behavior.
The term “liberal democracy” can be defined in many ways, denoting among other things
a state with a representative government, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights,
and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.162 Of particular importance for
purposes here is the guarantee of civil and political rights that assures individuals, the media and
private interest groups the opportunity to interact in “civil society” free of undue interference
from State organs.163
Even scholars from states with an authoritarian history and non-liberal traditions candidly
observe that a commitment to a non-binding space code of conduct (that expresses nothing more
than a joint declaration of intent) can carry more weight in democratic nations, “where military
programs and financing are transparent, and where military agencies and the military-industrial
complex are monitored by independent parliaments and civilian groups.”164
Without similar societal conditions and monitoring by democratic institutions and
independent media organizations, authoritarian leaders may thus feel free to breach any code they
might sign, “as long as their violations remain hidden from the world community.”165 Even in the
case of legally binding agreements, any form of “societal verification” of disarmament and arms
control treaties is possible “only in democracies tolerating transparency in military affairs, open
discussion of security issues and unhampered activities of the mass media.”166 Since soft law
instruments like the Code do not benefit from verification regimes, enforcement mechanisms,
legally binding dispute resolution procedures or even agreed standards of interpretation, they
depend entirely on self-enforcement by subscribing states and whatever societal verification is
present in those states.
The argument here is not that liberal and non-liberal states clearly display different levels
of compliance with respect to their international legal obligations, although some scholars have
suggested (somewhat controversially) that such distinctions can be made.167 Rather, the argument
162
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is that non-binding international instruments may be scrutinized very differently in liberal
democracies than they are in authoritarian states, particularly in states where a hospitable
environment is provided for private interest groups to freely investigate, evaluate and criticize
government military programs and assess whether they are consistent with the spirit of
international commitments.168
The preference of authoritarian states for non-binding instruments is not, however, an
absolute one. For example, in some cases, authoritarian regimes may prefer a more advantageous
legally binding agreement that clearly restricts their adversaries’ more sophisticated technology
while permitting the continuing deployment of their own less sophisticated but still effective
weapon systems (as seen in the case of China and Russia’s current support of the proposed PPWT
over the Code.)169
In other cases, military activities which are able to be observed by the entire international
community (particularly in space) may result in unwanted attention and pressure from the
international community, leading authoritarian states to eschew soft law arrangements, legally
binding agreements or any other instruments that have the potential to restrict their military
activities in space.170 However, in areas such as weapons research and development – where
authoritarian societies can ensure that secrecy will be more effectively maintained and that
criticism by independent actors in their societies will be far less likely – soft law arms control
arrangements may present clearer advantages over rival democratic states.
While authoritarian states may be able to pursue space-related military activities,
especially space weapons research and development (R&D) programs, with a relative lack of
scrutiny under a non-binding code, liberal democracies may face serious obstacles in pursuing
similar activities that relate to military programs involving potentially restricted offensive
capabilities. For this reason, some commentators argue that an instrument like the Code, even
though it is a non-binding instrument, could “exert de facto influence on U.S. space programs.”171
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R&D activities with ambiguous or multiple goals related to future military activities in
space may be viewed with considerable suspicion by interested observers in legislatures and
among members of a state’s civil society, particularly if those activities are seen as being
inconsistent with the spirit or terms of international commitments. Arms control regimes that
affect the future military capabilities of the most powerful states generally entail predictions by
those states about future technological developments.172 Acting on these predictions may be
complicated in democracies where governments face public scrutiny in their selection and funding
of technological alternatives related to future military missions.173
Classified U.S military space R&D programs, including current projects like the X-37B,
continue to be the subject of media attention, analysis and speculation in the United States, but
they do not face restrictions or broad public opposition based on their violation of U.S. laws or
international obligations. Thus, within the framework of existing laws and international
obligations, U.S. military planners and researchers have considerable flexibility to pursue diverse
military projects associated with current and future security requirements and goals in space.
Predicting future military missions and associated technological requirements are perilous
undertakings for governments in any area of national security, and none may be more challenging
as predicting future threats and programs in the vast and complex realm of outer space.174 For
this reason it is not surprising that some members of the U.S. Congress have sharply criticized the
Code based on the “unknown consequences” that indefinite limitations under that document could
have on “future military or intelligence programs.”175
A soft law instrument with broad and vague objectives that restricts future military
activities may thus serve to effectively limit some technological options available to participating
democratic states (if those states make good faith efforts to fully comply and respect the spirit and
letter of the commitments made in those instruments.) Such concerns are reflected in the views of
some critics who argue that the Code would disadvantage the United States by impeding advances
in space technology because those advances are also likely to be labelled as “military” in nature
and inconsistent with the goal of preventing an “arms race” in space.176
Successful military operations in outer space remain highly dependent on advanced
technology. For this reason, U.S. space policies have long emphasized that “to achieve national
security objectives and compete successfully internationally, the U.S. must maintain technological

172

COLIN S. GRAY, HOUSE OF CARDS: WHY ARMS CONTROL MUST FAIL 43 (1992).
Id. (noting that “[a]rms Control, which entails a greater or lesser measure of technology prediction, typically has
the effect for democracies of constraining the range of choice among possible solutions to problems that are left
unaddressed or underaddressed.”).
174
Letter from Rep. Michael Turner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Strategic Forces, H. Armed Services Comm. et al., to
President Barack Obama (Jan. 18, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al.]
(“… no one can know today what programs the United States may need to undertake in outer space in the future for
its military and intelligence national security requirements.”).
175
Id.
176
See, e.g., John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Opinion, Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html?_r=0; See also CODE, supra note 31,
Preamble, ¶6 (noting “the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space.”).
173

29

leadership in space.”177 Recent U.S. space policy statements reaffirm that the United States must
continue to “pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative exploitation
techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic advantage in
space.”178
Since a state’s judgment of its military strength and security is inherently relativistic,
international competition in national security matters is more like a race than an effort to achieve
any specific standard or goal.179 Important technological innovations fundamentally change the
nature of this race as they may allow a state “to get a competitive jump on its rivals.”180
Technological innovations with military implications by one state may thus inspire great
insecurity in other states, particularly as they relate to activities in outer space.181
For a liberal democracy involved in national security-related “competition” in space,
efforts to achieve and maintain technological superiority may present special challenges. Broad
R&D initiatives related to new space technologies with military applications are likely to be
scrutinized by legislatures, the media and domestic interest groups and may raise suspicions that
new offensive space capabilities are under development. Currently, such suspicions are not
invoked in support of campaigns or significant protests against the U.S. government for violating
any international commitments in space. If, however, the United States subscribes to the Code,
this scrutiny would have a new focus.
The continuing revision of official drafts of the Code indicates that new U.S. space
military capabilities, even if they are described as being “defensive” in nature, are likely to be
heavily scrutinized and criticized if the United States adopts the Code. For example, although an
earlier 2010 draft of the Code explicitly provided that “a comprehensive approach to safety and
security in outer space should be guided by … due consideration for the legitimate defence
interests of States,” that clause was omitted in the 2013 revised draft because it “was seen as
particularly troublesome by many states given that it could be interpreted subjectively, favoring
certain states to potentially weaponize their space capabilities.”182
Even the basic reference to the inherent right of states to individual and collective selfdefense in the current draft of the Code is problematic for some states since they view such a
provision as a “back door” to “legitimising weaponisation of outer space.”183 While a clause
explicitly ensuring the fundamental right of self-defense is an essential requirement for the United
States in any code of conduct for space activities, countries which view U.S. space programs with
177
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suspicion continue to fear that such a provision “opens the possibilities to increase the use of
force, weapons and the militarisation of the outer space arena.”184
The fears that states clearly harbor regarding the militarization and weaponization of space
(and related suspicions regarding U.S. space programs) seem likely to generate controversy over
the interpretation by the United States of key terms in any future version of the Code to which the
United States subscribes. Similar interpretations and related new military space programs and
research activities may be pursued without difficulty in authoritarian states, but would be subject
to great scrutiny by private interest groups, the media and the Congress in the United States.
The potential public scrutiny of U.S. compliance with Code provisions has led some
conservative critics in the United States to argue that, even though it is a non-binding instrument,
the Code could effectively impede a variety of U.S. military space programs and a host of
technology improvements that may have military or intelligence applications to space.185 While
some of these fears may be overstated, they nonetheless represent concerns that are present only
in a liberal democracy or a state in which military programs and financing are relatively
transparent, and where military agencies and defense industries are monitored by independent
legislatures, media, and civil society groups.
Part IV: The Code as a Problematic Soft Law Variant
The Problem of “Soft Law on Soft Law”
Since the subject matter of the proposed Code clearly involves issues of common concern
to all states, it might appear at first glance to be a document that could be easily embraced by the
international community. States have not, however, acted with any sense of urgency in approving
the proposed Code, which has been under consideration since 2008. This lack of enthusiasm may
be attributed in part to the fact that the proposed Code is not the first soft law instrument to
address the subject matter at issue. In fact, efforts to promote the Code raise serious questions
about the effectiveness of duplicative soft law approaches to key problems in space and about the
wisdom of imposing one type of soft law framework on top of another, different, existing type of
soft law. This is particularly true as it relates to addressing the most pressing issue now
confronting the international community in space: the problem of orbital space debris.
The proposed Code represents a particular type of soft law, one which is developed at a
high level by the diplomats of states and international organizations. While such “top-down
184

Roberto Becerra & Romina Acevedo, ICoC: Perspectives from Latin America and the Caribbean, in AWAITING
LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 169, 173 (further noting that “[d]eveloping countries, particularly those in Latin America
and the Caribbean, have expressed that consensus will be difficult to reach if the text of ICoC refers to the concept of
right to self-defence.”); Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for Outer Space, Council on Foreign Relations (2011),
http://breaking defense. com/2013/07/landmark-space-policy-shift-as-china-others-agrees-to-talk-about-space-codeof-conduct/ (“Officials from Brazil and many other South American countries have said that the explicit reference to
Article 51 undermines several important aspects of the code. They fear that Article 4.2 of the code will be used to
justify weaponizing space and create an arms race in space under the veiled claims of defense.”).
185
Bolton & Yoo, supra note 176 (“Taken literally, the European Union code would interfere with our ability to
develop antiballistic missile systems in space, test antisatellite weapons and gather intelligence.”). See also, Letter
from Thirty-Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011), supra note 82.

31

diplomatic approaches” can make significant contributions to collaborative activities in space,
another approach to soft law focuses on the technical work of specialized governmental agencies
and on “bottom-up best practices developed and demonstrated by commercial operators, academic
institutions, and other technical experts.”186
Bottom-up, non-binding best practices and similar initiatives are typified by approaching
space topics “from an applied technical perspective focusing on solving problems facing those
working and operating in the space field.”187 In contrast to what is sometimes referred to as the
“top-down diplomatic approach,” this bottom-up approach allows specific technical issues to be
addressed in detail by individuals drawn from the community of technical experts who are “best
qualified to address the specifics” and who represent industry, non-governmental organizations,
and the specialized governmental agencies of the interested parties.188
The most successful and widely recognized example of the bottom-up, non-binding, best
practices approach in space is the collaborative development of international space debris
mitigation guidelines by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).189 The IADC
consists of the representatives of the European Space Agency and the space agencies of the
twelve most active space nations who exchange information on space debris research activities,
cooperate on space debris research, and identify debris mitigation options.190 Drawing on
NASA’s 1995 Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (the world’s first such guidelines), the
IADC developed a set of technical guidelines for minimizing the creation of space debris, the
IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines (the “IADC Guidelines”), and submitted them to the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) in 2002.191 The IADC
Guidelines served as the basis for the UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (UN
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COPUOS Guidelines) which were adopted in 2007 and later endorsed by the U.N. General
Assembly.192
Although the IADC and subsequent UN COPUOS Guidelines are non-binding, they have
had an important and legally significant impact on the national regulatory frameworks of many
countries.193 In the United States, these debris mitigation practices have been implemented for
government-sponsored space missions through directives and instructions of NASA and DoD and
for commercial space operations through the regulations and procedures of the Federal
Communications Commission, and the Departments of Commerce and Transportation.194 The
cumulative effect of numerous countries and their national agencies implementing such
regulations is an increasingly more harmonized approach in national legal frameworks to the
critical issue of space debris generation. Although these practical, bottom-up, technical-based
debris mitigation standards originated in a soft law instrument, there is nonetheless a reasonable
chance that they will evolve into “a generally accepted state of art which no actual or potential
actor in space can afford to ignore.”195
While each country’s debris mitigation standards and regulations vary, their fundamental
principles and objectives – as established in the IADC Guidelines – are the same: “(1) Preventing
on-orbit break-ups; (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that have reached the end of their
mission operations from the useful densely populated orbit regions, and (4) limiting the objects
released during normal operations.”196 These objectives are achieved through requirements and
standards which address: objects released intentionally and unintentionally during mission
operations; fragments caused by on-obit breakups (including on-orbit collisions, accidental breakups, and intentional destruction of objects); and, break-ups after mission termination.197
The IADC Guidelines, and the UN COPUOS Guidelines that they inspired, have made a
widely recognized, significant contribution to preserving the outer space environment and
numerous states have codified debris mitigation standards into their national regulatory
frameworks.198 Citing the success of collaborative, technical, bottom-up debris mitigation efforts,
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critics of the proposed Code suggest that a top-down, diplomatically-driven multilateral code is
“not needed to spur international dialogue on issues important to space operations.”199 In
addition, unlike the defined technical objectives and agreed processes that have served as a solid
foundation for IADC efforts, critics note that states subscribing to the Code are guided only by
statements of principles with no accompanying indication of how those principles are to be
recognized or practically implemented. 200
A diplomatically driven, top-down form of soft law being imposed on a technical, bottomup version also raises the prospect of confusion and potential conflict between different
frameworks attempting to regulate the same subject matter. With multiple frameworks seeking to
establish the same type of operational space guidelines, some experts question whether any clarity
that has or can be achieved in this area “will soon become over-complicated by a plethora of
‘how-to’ efforts...”201
Differences in the nature of the entities responsible for top-down and bottom-up initiatives
in space may further complicate the practical application of technical rules and standards in space.
In contrast to technical guidelines developed first at the working level, top-down, diplomatically
driven initiatives are generally sponsored by international organizations (such as various U.N.
institutions) with high-level officials representing many states and operating by consensus – thus
giving rise to fears voiced by some experts that there is a “substantial risk that politics may
overtake practical substance” in this area.202
Conflicting interpretations of different guidelines which are applied to the same subject
matter in space, yet are generated by contrasting soft law approaches, may have highly negative
consequences. If the statements of principles in the proposed Code are nothing more than a
reaffirmation of existing principles and an endorsement of the standards already developed by the
IADC, it is hard to see much value in the great effort expended to date on their adoption. If, on
the other hand, the proposed Code is intended to create new norms (as its proponents suggest),
there is a risk of disputes arising from conflicting interpretations of these different soft law
frameworks, resulting in an even less stable security environment in space.203
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If any soft law mechanism is to be employed in improving the security of space objects
(particularly to address the problem of orbital debris), there is a strong argument to be made for
bottom-up, technically-based guidelines as a means of developing at least some types of
significant rules-based behavior.204 Such technical guidelines enhancing the security of space
operations are historically not the results of top-down diplomatic efforts, but instead are drawn
from the “existing operational experience of the principal actors, commercial operators and
government agencies.”205 It is this community of actors, and not the “space diplomatic corps in
Vienna,” that some commentators argue is the “proper source for the emergence of a normative,
behavior-oriented regime.”206
Two other major goals of the proposed Code – improving space safety and space traffic
management (STM) – are fundamentally linked to the problem of space debris and appear to also
be best addressed, and to some extent are already being addressed, by bottom-up, technical
collaboration instead of top-down, diplomatic initiatives.207 International air traffic controls may
perhaps be cited as a precedent or analogy for this approach, since those controls emerged only
after many years of working-level efforts involving airlines, pilots, airports, technicians and
various governmental agencies responsible for aviation matters.208
With respect to initial, inter-agency efforts to address space traffic management issues, the
U.S. Strategic Command has in recent years entered into “Space Situational Awareness” (SSA)
sharing agreements with 41 commercial firms and five nations in order to develop routine
operational space partnerships and improved international data sharing.209 These SSA
Agreements are described as laying the foundation for increased international cooperation, and
are further aided by efforts to integrate partner nation sensors into the U.S. Space Surveillance
Network.210 Expanded operational working relationships in this area continue to be encouraged
by the U.S. Government, particularly by the U.S. Defense Department, in order to “improve the
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quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of flight
services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms.”211
There are also private efforts involving operational data exchanges aimed at ensuring the
“safety and integrity of satellite operations” through “controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of
data.”212 The Space Data Association, a private limited liability non-profit, has developed the
Space Data Center (SDC), which is described as a “secure, reliable completely automated
analytical information system,” in order to address “conjunction analysis and [radio-frequency
interference.]”213 The SDC has been programmed so as to allow members of the Space Data
Association to share “real-time critical operational data essential to the better protection of their
respective satellite fleets and management of the overall earth orbit environment.”214 This private
initiative at reducing satellite collisions is recognized as “the way forward” alongside the IADC
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.215
Unlike fledgling public and private efforts to advance STM and space safety issues, debris
mitigation measures have achieved a significant level of development and sophistication over
many years under the auspices of the IADC. While the impact of the IADC Guidelines is
significant, major issues related to orbital space debris remain to be addressed by the international
community, including remediation problems and certain critical activities (notably the intentional
destruction of objects in space as part of hit-to-kill ASAT weapons testing) that produce
unusually large and dangerous amounts of debris.216 Because these problems are linked to
important and sensitive arms control and security issues in space, they lie beyond the competence
of a set of voluntary, technical best practices or the competence of any other soft law
instrument.217 The intentional destruction of a space object by China (in its debris-generating
ASAT test in January, 2007) clearly demonstrates this point, since the non-binding IADC
Guidelines then in effect (which China had subscribed to) called upon states to avoid the
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“intentional destruction of a space system (self-destruction, intentional collision etc.) and other
harmful activities that may significantly increase collision risks to other systems…”218
It is thus not surprising that although the IADC Guidelines (and the national laws and
regulations implementing those guidelines) have contributed to improving the regulation of space
debris, some commentators suggest that non-binding mechanisms like the Guidelines might not
represent “the optimal solution in the long run,” especially if the goal is to effectively regulate all
actors in space.219 Instead, they correctly argue that the time has come for states to instead agree
on legally binding measures for regulating the prevention and management of space debris.220
To the extent that soft law can play a valuable role in mitigating space debris, it appears to
be best employed in bottom-up initiatives based on the successful model of the IADC Guidelines.
A new type of soft law placed on top of these existing efforts cannot accomplish what a new
legally binding agreement can achieve, particularly in the context of volatile space arms control
and security issues. On the contrary, such a top-down, diplomatically-driven soft law approach
risks causing confusion, conflict and greater insecurity in space while at the same time
diminishing the existing legal and administrative framework governing activities in space.
B. The Problem of “Fractional Soft Law”
Even though the first draft of the proposed Code was introduced over seven years ago,
wide-spread acceptance of the document by states has been understandably difficult to achieve; as
of the most recent meeting of 109 states discussing the adoption of the Code (in September 2015),
there is still no timetable for its finalization.221 The proposed Code continues to enjoy support
from only a fraction of the international community. Although some significant space-faring
countries, including members of the European Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia, have
expressed varying degrees of support for the proposed Code, opposition continues to be expected
from other major space powers, particularly Russia and China.222
Opposition to the proposed Code from the Russian and Chinese governments appears to
be motivated primarily by the continuing concern of these major space powers that efforts to
promote the Code could undermine the adoption of their preferred, jointly proposed and legally
binding PPWT agreement.223 While the PPWT requires states-parties “not to place any weapons
218
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in outer space,” it controversially excludes any restrictions on terrestrially-based ASAT weapons
(which the United States describes as “the most pressing, existing threat to outer space
systems.”)224 For this and other reasons, including the lack of any verification regime, the United
States has rejected the PPWT for failing to meet its standards for consideration of space arms
control proposals, namely that they “must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the
national security of the United States and its allies.”225 To this point in time, however, the
benefits and relative advantages that Russia and China perceive in continuing to promote the
legally binding PPWT (which the United States does not hesitate to describe as an inequitable and
flawed agreement) appear to outweigh any interest in subscribing to the Code.
The Russian and Chinese governments are currently joined by other states (e.g., Brazil,
India and South Africa) in expressing a preference for some form of legally binding agreement
over the Code.226 Numerous states, including significant space stakeholders such as India and
Brazil, have also frequently expressed serious concerns about the Euro-centric process adopted by
the European Union to advance the Code.227 Indeed, the failure of the European Union to include
non-EU states (other than the United States) in the early stages of developing the Code has been
strongly criticized and continues to cast doubts on prospects for the instrument’s wider
acceptance.228 (This concern recently led many states to request that future discussions of Code
be moved to a truly multilateral forum, preferably the U.N. General Assembly.229) Several
emerging space powers have also expressed concern about signing the proposed Code because of
“possible constraints applied to nascent space programmes,” a concern which forms part of a
larger criticism that international opinion on activities in space is too much a by-product of the
strategies of the main space powers.230
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Although the United States had originally expressed tentative support for the proposed
code, on January 17, 2012, the U.S. State Department issued a statement announcing that “[t]he
European Union’s draft Code of Conduct is a good foundation for the development of a nonlegally binding International Code of Conduct.”231 While emphasizing that the United States
would join with the European Union and other states to develop a code of conduct for outer space
activities, Secretary of State Clinton declared that “we will not enter into a code of conduct that in
any way constrains our national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect the
United States and our allies.”232 To this point, however, the United States has not offered any
proposed alternative to the Code.233
Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s reluctance to sign the current draft of the
proposed Code, senior U.S. officials argue that a code of conduct for space could enhance US
national security by “serving as one of the most visible and political ways in which nations
commit to acting responsibly in space” and that “[n]ations willfully acting contrary to a code
could expect to be isolated as rogue actors.”234 Yet these same officials also concede that it is
only by “establishing widely accepted guidelines for responsible behavior in space” that the
national security of the United States and its allies will be enhanced.235
A similar official position found in a U.S. Department of Defense press release notes that
“[a] widely-subscribed Code can encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who
act otherwise, while reducing risk of misunderstanding and misconduct.”236 Another DoD fact
sheet notes that it is a “broadly-accepted set of international norms of responsible behavior” that
can be expected to have “a positive effect on deterrence” and “help the international community
identify and isolate aggressors.”237
Thus, according to U.S. Department of Defense policy, only a “widely-subscribed” and
“broadly-accepted” code (that presumably includes major space-faring powers like Russia and
China) could hope to identify and isolate states that act contrary to its rules (notwithstanding the
nations in Africa and Latin America are yet to fully develop their space capabilities, so some perceive any regulatory
instrument by the West as an effort to limit their future capabilities.”).
231
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need for such rules to also be part of a clear, legally binding and credible commitment by the
states involved, as discussed above). Although the Russian and Chinese governments could view
the non-binding Code as providing some relative compliance advantages over the United States
(as discussed in Part 3.D., above), they are unlikely to subscribe to the Code if doing so in any
way interferes with their continuing efforts to promote their higher priority -- and to them, more
advantageous -- legally binding PPWT agreement.238
Russia and China thus continue to lie beyond the reach of the Code, defeating efforts by
proponents to make the Code a widely subscribed and broadly accepted instrument and greatly
diminishing its purported “norm-setting” capabilities. Whatever benefits soft law instruments are
asserted to have in addressing security matters, participation by only a fraction of states in the
Code, particularly a fraction that fails to include all the major space-faring countries, will not
provide a sound basis for establishing new norms or help to identify or isolate aggressors and
other non-participating, misbehaving states. Furthermore, states facing perceived security threats
in space are not likely to be assured by a fractional version of the Code in which their potential
adversaries do not even participate.
In some areas of international cooperation, such as the protection of human rights,
persuading only a fraction of states to initially sign multilateral instruments may be viewed as a
positive, progressive step of achievement (particularly since human rights agreements are not
focused on reciprocal obligations).239 As an arms control initiative for space, however, the
Code’s failure to include Russia and China and other major space stakeholders is a fundamental
flaw. The absence of powerful, potential adversaries makes multilateral conventions addressing
arms control or disarmament issues highly problematic for those states contemplating joining
such regimes and making potentially dangerous, non-reciprocal commitments.240 To the extent
that soft law arrangements such as the proposed Code seek to promote arms control measures in
the face of severe security dilemmas and the threat of arms races, the non-participation of
powerful adversaries clearly undermines such efforts.
If the proposed Code is adopted by states in its current state of limited acceptance, a
fractional soft law product will emerge which will present its own particular disadvantages and
problems (beyond those associated with soft law arrangements generally). Not only would a
fractionalized Code fail to identify aggressors and isolate rogue states, it could instead lead to de
facto competing legal regimes in space, as subscribing states respect their own “rules of the road”
while other non-participating states – especially major, non-participating space powers – seek to
advance their own interests through different or less restrictive approaches. Attempts to later
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successfully persuade non-participating states to accede to the Code will be challenging, if not
impossible, and could risk further weakening rather than improving the code.241
Still another casualty of a fractionalized Code would be any attempt to establish new and
meaningful transparency and confidence building measures through the sharing of information.
Information serves a central function in the Code since subscribing states resolve to share
information on a wide variety of topics, notably regarding “their space strategies and policies,
including those which are security-related, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security,
and sustainability of current and planned activities in outer space” as well as “their major outer
space research and space applications programmes.”242
Space law generally seeks to maintain a focus on the free and open sharing of information
for the benefit and safety of all nations.243 The Code, however, contains restrictive informationsharing provisions requiring subscribing states to share information only with other subscribing
states.244 This restrictive information sharing arrangement, which was not part of the first draft of
the Code in 2008, appears to reflect the insecurity of would-be subscribing states as they now
contemplate the likelihood of fractional state participation in the Code and the possibility of
sharing potentially sensitive information with numerous non-subscribing states on a nonreciprocal basis. This restrictive information arrangement defeats the larger purposes of the Code
(“enhancing the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities”245 ) since even
information relating to potentially dangerous activities which threaten all space-faring states are
not required under the Code to be distributed to the international community as a whole.
The absence of key state actors in the information sharing process significantly undermines
the ability of the Code to bring genuine transparency to space activities. Furthermore, the
voluntary nature of the process does nothing to ensure the accuracy or completeness of the
information that is submitted, especially since subscribing states are unlikely to voluntarily submit
many types of sensitive space data related to important scientific and technological capabilities.246
The obvious failings of this mechanism have prompted harsh criticism, with one commentator
noting that “[t]he basic purpose behind the CoC gets defeated if insufficient, inaccurate and
irregular information is provided by states.”247 The incomplete and voluntary information
disclosure process also fundamentally undercuts the hoped-for ability of the proposed Code to
help identify “bad sheep.”248
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There are few, if any, examples of non-binding, multilateral codes being used to address
significant arms control issues. This lack of state practice is itself a compelling indication of the
unsuitability of soft law instruments in this area. However, in defending the President’s authority
to sign non-binding documents related to security matters, the U.S. State Department has cited the
2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the HCoC)249 as a good
example of a “similarly non-binding code.”250 Upon closer inspection, however, not only is the
HCoC unlike the Code in important respects (and unlike other instruments addressing problems
posed by weapons of mass destruction), it is better cited as an example of the failure of nonbinding instruments to successfully address security matters – particularly when those instruments
exclude numerous significant state actors.251
At the outset, it should be noted that the HCoC constitutes a much more limited attempt than
the Code to address international security matters and does not present states like the United
States with any new arms control-type constraints.252 As noted by one congressman during
hearings related to the funding of national security space activities, the HCoC imposed no
restraints on U.S. military operations while, in contrast, an Executive Summary of the Joint Staff
Operations assessment of the proposed Code stated that “[i]f the United States were to make a
good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft code, there could be operation[al]
impacts on U.S. military space operations in several areas.”253
Furthermore, unlike the broad scope and objectives of the Code, the HCoC attempts only to
make modest inroads in restricting the proliferation of one specific weapon system (ballistic
missiles). In addition, the very limited commitments that states undertake when they subscribe to
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the HCoC are phrased in even weaker and more ambiguous terms than those contained in the
Code.254
Notwithstanding the limited scope and other shortcomings of the HCoC, its ability to have
any meaningful impact has been significantly further diminished by its fractional subscription. It
is particularly handicapped since “the majority of Asian countries that contribute to the challenge
of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”255 The lack of many significant actors in
the HCoC regime, or in any other fractional soft law regime that attempts to address security
matters, fundamentally undermines any credibility it may have as an international security tool.256
Thus, in the absence of some mechanism to ensure the inclusion of the key actors in the Code, it
has been argued that the Code “is likely to see a repeat of the experience with the HCoC in which
most Asian countries of proliferation concern have chosen to remain outside the mechanism.”257
The HCoC is thus an instructive example regarding soft law instruments, but not a positive
one. As noted by one commentator, its limitations as a fractionalized soft law instrument are selfevident, as it appears to have done very little to limit the spread of ballistic missile technology.258
With many key states refusing to subscribe to the HCoC and many signatory states failing to
implement it, the HCoC underlines the limited value of so-called “norms” in non-legally binding
documents in which “there is no obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher chance
for weak adherence.”259
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In light of the issues discussed above, it is not surprising that many advocates of the Code
stress the crucial need for all interested nations, particularly all major space stakeholders, to sign
the Code in order for it to have any chance of success.260 Without the participation of these states,
the proposed Code is doomed to become part of an unusual class of particularly ineffective soft
law instruments. Furthermore, in the case of arms control measures, potential dangers lurk for
states like the United States that choose to subscribe to such fractionalized soft law instruments
and attempt to comply in good faith with their restrictions.
C. “Non-Binding Norm-Creating” and the Democracy Deficit
One suggested advantage of soft law instruments over hard law is that they are easier for
states to negotiate and conclude while retaining the ability to later serve as the possible basis for
legally binding obligations. This advantage flows from the capacity of soft law instruments to be
both “non-binding” and “norm-creating.” Yet soft law’s non-binding and norm-creating qualities
may pose a dilemma for the legislatures of democratic states, as illustrated by the unfolding
controversy in the United States over the possible adoption of the proposed Code. At first glance
it may seem surprising that a state’s legislative body would be concerned about a legally nonbinding instrument, but such a document takes on new significance when a state’s executive
unilaterally (without involving the legislature) proclaims that the adopted instrument will be
promoted by that state as a basis for creating new binding rules of customary international law.
1. The Code Controversy Within the U.S. Government
In contrast to the space policies of previous administrations, the Obama Administration
has expressed a desire to promote new types of collaborative activities in space and a willingness
to consider proposals for space-related arms control agreements (albeit with significant
caveats.)261 It has also indicated a willingness to consider a variety of new soft law mechanisms
for outer space, including those which contribute to the development of what it described as
“norms of behavior for responsible space operations.”262
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Consistent with its new space policies, the U.S. government expressed tentative support in
2009 for the proposed Code, subject to its formulation as a legally non-binding instrument. 263
Stressing the power of soft, non-binding instruments to build norms, a fact sheet released by DoD
in 2011 noted that “[t]he United States is working closely with the European Union on a draft
international Code of Conduct, which could serve as an important first set of norms of responsible
behavior.”264
On February 2, 2011, thirty-seven members of the U.S. Senate expressed significant
concerns about the proposed Code in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.265 On January
17, 2012, the State Department announced that the United States would not sign on to the EU’s
current draft of a proposed Code, but that it would nonetheless “join with the European Union and
other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space
activities.”266
While several ranking members of U.S. Congress indicated in a letter to President Obama
of January 18, 2012, that they applauded the decision to not sign the current version of the draft
Code because it presented “significant policy and operational concerns,” they also expressed
grave reservations about the proposed use by the Executive Branch of a non-binding soft law
mechanism to promote possible restrictions on US military and intelligence capabilities and
space.267 Of particular importance for purposes of this article, the congressmen questioned the
appropriateness of the Code’s non-binding, norm-creating approach as applied to arms control in
space. They argued that the Code, if adopted, could be used “as a starting point” for the
negotiation of an international arms control agreement, and further suggested that it could
“establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the United States without
the approval of Congress.”268 Such a legally binding impact on the United States could
presumably take place through the codification of Code provisions in future international
conventions (although this would require congressional involvement in order to be internally
binding on the United States) and/or their transformation through state practice into rules of
customary international law which would be binding on all states.
Furthermore, the perceived advantage of non-binding instruments to harmonize
international standards by generating uniform domestic legal requirements was directly criticized
by the congressmen, who noted that although the Administration argued that the draft Code would
be “non-binding and voluntary, the implementing regulations surely would be binding.”269
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Writing in response to the Congressman on behalf of the President, a senior State
Department official noted that the Code “would not be a treaty or international agreement that
would impose legal obligations on the United States” and that it was not “a legally-binding arms
control agreement.”270 While this is an accurate statement, it is also a narrow one that does not
speak to the possibility that the Code could generate legally binding domestic regulations, serve
as the basis for future legally binding agreements, or give rise to new legally binding norms of
customary international law.
In response to concerns expressed by some members of Congress that the proposed Code
represented “arms control by the back door,” administration officials did not dispute that the
substance of the draft Code related to arms control issues, only that it was not “arms control”
because the Code itself is “not legally binding.”271 Nevertheless, some members of Congress
argued that this process could result in legally binding obligations and related policies being
approved without their input and outside the normal process for considering and approving
congressional-executive agreements or ratifying treaties.272
While the Obama Administration has correctly emphasized that the proposed Code is not a
proposed international agreement and is thus not subject to the procedural and substantive rules
governing the consideration, authorization and conclusion of international agreements, the
potentially legally binding impact of the Code through its contribution to the formation of
customary international law is another matter. 273 In that regard, the executive’s unilateral
adoption of such a soft law instrument would leave the legislative branch in a poor position to
affect what it views as an objectionable step by the United States in leading the way in the
potential development of new rules of customary international law that could restrict U.S. military
capabilities and operations in space.
As noted above, arms control measures (defined by the U.S. Congress as any action that
“would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United
States in a militarily significant manner”) are the subject of a special statutory regime (requiring
such obligations to be made pursuant to the treaty-making power or with affirmative legislation
by the Congress).274 Questions regarding the applicability of this statutory regime have escalated
the conflict between the U.S. legislative and executive branches over the proposed Code.275 The
result was the enactment in 2014 of an unprecedented piece of legislation entitled “Limitation on
International Agreements Concerning Outer Space Activities,” found in Section 913 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“Section 913.”)276
270
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Not surprisingly, Section 913 reaffirmed the requirement that any obligation to reduce or
limit the armed forces or armaments of the United States in outer space in a militarily significant
manner be accomplished only pursuant to a treaty or specific statutory authorization.277 However,
Section 913 also broke new ground by establishing several onerous certification requirements,
one of which may cast a long shadow over America’s ability to continue to play a leading role in
helping to form rules of customary international law for outer space. In particular, Section
913(a)(1) contains unusual criteria which appear to prevent soft law instruments like the Code
from serving as a basis for both future international agreements and rules of customary
international law.
Among other things, Section 913(a)(1) requires the President to submit to appropriate
congressional committees a certification that “such agreement has no legally-binding effect or
basis for limiting the activities of the United States in outer space.”278 In reluctantly signing the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, President Obama issued a statement
indicating that certain provisions in this Act, including Section 913, “could interfere with my
constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”279
The legal significance, if any, of presidential signing statements in this context is hotly
contested.280 A full examination, however, of the constitutional status of presidential signing
statements, related separation of powers issues, and the capacity of the President to lawfully
engage in a wide spectrum of executive acts related to international affairs is beyond the scope of
this paper. However, other issues arising from the divided and conflicted participation of the
American democracy (or any other democracy) in the formation of customary international law
deserve special attention here, particularly as they relate to the adoption of a soft law instrument
on the basis of its non-binding yet norm-creating character.
2. The Code, “Norm-Creating,” and the Formation of Customary International Law
Repeated statements by U.S. officials that the proposed Code entails no legal obligations
because it is not a legally binding agreement unfortunately speak to only one dimension of the
Act based on the unacceptable way Section 913 and other provisions in the bill impeded the President’s ability to
execute new defense strategies and allocate resources and the manner in which Section 913 specifically could
“encroach on the Executive's exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations and could severely hamper U.S. ability
to conduct bilateral space cooperation activities with key allies.”). See Statement of Administration Policy, OFFICE
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. 4310 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2013.
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possible legal significance of this soft law instrument. As Senator Ben Nelson remarked to
administration officials in Congressional hearings on the proposed Code, “[i]t may not be a treaty,
but as you well know, it will establish international norms amongst nations.”281 In fact, lines
separating the promotion of new “norms” found in legally non-binding instruments (that the
United States expects other countries to follow) and efforts to establish new binding rules of
customary international law are easily blurred, especially as U.S. Executive Branch officials
continue to promote the Code as an instrument for setting “norms for which responsible spacefaring nations would conform their conduct.”282
For purposes of legal analysis, non-binding “norms” or guidelines found in soft law
instruments must be distinguished from legally binding rules of customary international law
(which are sometimes also referred to as “norms”). Customary international law consists of a set
of legal obligations arising from the practice of states and is recognized as a “leading, wellrespected source of international law, fully on par with treaties.”283 In the words of the American
Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, customary
international law emanates “from a general and consistent practice of states, followed by them
from a sense of legal obligation.”284
Customary international law has played a key role in space. For example, many of the
most important and fundamental principles of space law found in the Outer Space Treaty have
been described as essentially codifying existing customary international law.285 Significantly, the
customary international law version of these rules has achieved wider or “more comprehensive
geographic coverage” than the treaty versions.286 As discussed in Part II above, customary
international law rules governing space activities have often emerged from soft law instruments,
including, in some circumstances, from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.287
281

Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for
Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the Subcomm. on Strat. Forces of the Comm. on
Armed Services, 112th Cong. 3 (March 21, 2012).
282
See, e.g., Id., at 9, (testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Sec’y of Defense for Global Strat. Aff.) (stating that
“[t]here are a number of responsible behaviors that we hope this code will identify and then set what would be the norms
for which responsible space-faring nations would conform their conduct.”).
283
David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1194 (2009).
284
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102.2 (1987).
285
Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13
J. SPACE L. 22, 25 (1985) (further noting that “the analysis of the practice of states before the conclusion of the 1967
Outer Space Treaty shows that historically custom was the first source of the international law of outer space.”);
NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 46 (1992) (describing the Outer Space Treaty
as the “Magna Carta of international space law” and noting that it was “built on several principles already enunciated
in the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space.”).
286
Koplow, supra note 283, at 1234. The International Court of Justice maintains that customary international law
rules underlying an international convention continue to exist erga omnes for both parties and non-parties. See MARK
EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 151-152 (1997) (also noting two alternative views when pre-existing customary
international law rules are codified in a convention: that these rules may be “crowded out” by the convention or that
they may simply parallel the convention, “at least as regards non-parties.”).
287
Frans von der Dunk, Contradictio in Terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the
Context of Space Activities, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 31, 32. (noting that the origins of space law can
be traced to “a handful of internal administrative and/or non-legally binding United Nations General Assembly

48

A non-binding principle contained in a soft law instrument may thus become a binding
rule of customary international law, but only if it enjoys sufficient conforming “general practice”
by states and is ultimately “accepted as law.”288 It should be noted that even if a document like
the proposed Code is initially declared by all subscribing states to be a “legally non-binding”
instrument, this may not prevent it from later contributing to the formation of a rule of customary
international law. For example, during the consideration of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights at a 1948 session of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Representative emphasized that
“It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a
statement of law or a legal obligation.”289 However, after years of conforming state practice and
reaffirmation of the norms in the Declaration by the United States, it was not difficult for a U.S.
federal court to later declare that one of those norms, the prohibition of torture, had become a
binding rule on all countries under customary international law.290
The process by which customary international law (CIL) is formed is not, however,
without its critics. For example, Professor J. Patrick Kelly has strongly criticized the lack of
democratic legitimacy in this process on several levels, arguing that “the majority of nations and
peoples of the world rarely participate in the creation of customary rules that limit their policy
choices and sovereignty” and that this “democracy deficit” broadly infects the process of CIL
norm formation.291
It is true that traditional international law doctrine has generally treated states and
governments as opaque “black boxes” and has thus “ignored the internal observance of
democracy as a relevant factor affecting their capacity to have a voice in international law
making.”292 Yet even while most international law scholars may be unwilling to fully embrace
Professor Kelly’s argument that the methodologies of all the major normative theories of
customary international law eviscerate the democratic legitimacy of CIL norms, there is still value
in recognizing and encouraging state participation in this process that also reflects the
participation of the people that these states are presumed to represent.293
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International legal obligations which are made pursuant to treaties or other
international agreements often involve legislative institutions and thus, at least in democratic
states, involve the participation of the elected representatives of the people in those states.
But in the case of other activities involving a state’s foreign affairs, including the signing of
legally non-binding documents that may give rise to customary international law, in some
countries the executive alone may speak for the government and the people.294
The ongoing controversy in the United States over the possible signature by the
President of the proposed Code implicates issues larger than domestic partisan politics and
interesting separation of power issues within the U.S. constitutional framework. Among
other things, the Code controversy highlights the limitations of non-binding soft law
instruments to generate legally binding “norms” of conduct under customary international
law. The unusual case of the executive and legislative branches of a major democracy
explicitly taking opposite views of the suitability of a soft law instrument (in this case the
proposed Code) to serve as a basis for future international legal obligations threatens not only
the future of U.S. participation in the Code, but also the key role that the United States has
long played in the development of the international legal regime governing activities in
space.295 If the United States were to approve the Code under these circumstances, it would
also give the Code an even more uncertain status, further undermining its relevance as well
as the underlying commitments of subscribing states.
The significance for international space law of the dispute over the Code between the U.S.
Executive and Legislative branches may be far-reaching. Although partisan disputes related to
international activities are hardly unusual in the United States, the formal and unprecedented
customary international law while at the same time “does not reject the legitimacy of the customary lawmaking
process as being irremediably ‘undemocratic’ by nature.”).
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action taken by the United States Congress to restrict the potential legal impact of the Code
potentially sets the stage for a broad and unfortunate attack on the use of soft law instruments as a
basis for forming future binding obligations in space under customary international law.
The controversy over the Code in the United States highlights the limitations of soft
instruments when they are used in place of legally binding international agreements and the
process whereby which such legally binding agreements are adopted. It also illustrates the
dangers that such non-binding documents may pose if they are used by the executives of states to
build norms in such a way that they further contribute to a “democracy deficit” in customary
international law. This is especially true for democratic states in the area of arms control where
important issues of national security are likely to call for processes which reflect a national
consensus and thus involve the participation of the people through their elected representatives in
order to obtain broad public support for the agreement.296 Soft law instruments may thus be a
problematic substitute for legally binding agreements on several levels, particularly when used to
address arms control and security issues.
Part V: Guiding Principles for Solutions in Space
Many challenges now confront states in their use of outer space, but none pose a greater
existential threat than the possibility that debris generated by human activities may render space
unsafe and unusable for hundreds or even thousands of years. However, the insecure strategic
environment in space means many proposed cooperative measures will not be able to effectively
address this threat and may instead only increase dangerous risks.
The dissimilar problems of space debris and arms control are generally addressed as
separate areas of concern by the international community. This is because the legal and political
framework which underlies efforts to manage the critical problem of orbital space debris (which
also includes the domestic laws and administrative regulations of many states) and the framework
which addresses arms control issues in space relate to fundamentally different subject areas.
Nonetheless, the two subject areas may implicate parallel concerns or involve interdependent
problems, as evidenced by the Code’s emphasis on preventing an arms race and regulating
military activities in outer space while reducing the creation of orbital space debris.297
Within the context of these different subject areas and frameworks, the search continues
for the “next step” towards meaningful international collaboration in addressing the most acute
296
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problems confronting the international community in space, particularly the problem of orbital
space debris. The proposed Code, a flawed soft law variant, is not a promising step. Soft law is
not, however, the only available solution or basis for that next step. Instead, certain alternative
principles emerge from the preceding analysis which may help guide states in their next attempt
to design other more effective instruments, regimes and approaches to advance the long-term and
sustainable use of outer space.
A. Pursue Hard Law Solutions with the Leading Spacefaring States
Meaningful initiatives to regulate weapons and military activities in space cannot succeed
when their design is divorced from the reality of the security dilemmas and perceived threats that
states face there. While soft law instruments may give the appearance of progress, they
notoriously achieve little on their own in addressing critical security issues in space.298 In this
realm, soft law instruments unfortunately do not assist states to convey credible commitments to
each other, do not provide the necessary assurances to prevent defensive defections from
international regimes, and do not create clear obligations to serve as the basis for effective
monitoring and verification regimes designed to prevent offensive defections. Instead, soft law’s
shortcomings, linked to design choices that weaken commitments along the dimensions of
precision or obligation or both, inspire uncertainty, reduce confidence, and dramatically diminish
the effectiveness any arms control measure in space.
The benefits of hard law regimes and the disadvantages of soft law instruments in the field
of arms control are compelling. This helps explain why, despite continuing and sometimes
intense diplomatic efforts to promote the adoption of the Code, a wide variety of experts from
numerous space-faring countries agree that a hard law approach is ultimately needed to deal with
the greatest challenges confronting the international community in space.299 It is also consistent
with demands by several major space stakeholders (including Brazil, India, South Africa, Russia
and China) that work on the Code “should not prejudice or delay the elaboration of legallybinding instruments to strengthen the existing legal framework for outer space.”300
As previously noted, however, proponents of soft law approaches often view legally
binding instruments for space activities as too difficult to achieve, pointing to the lack of any new
hard law agreements since 1979. Unfortunately, the attention, time and government resources
dedicated to promoting the Code appear to be diverting efforts from more meaningful and
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important work on any new legally binding agreements.301 The lengthy, continuing statesponsored deliberations related to the Code present only an illusion of progress, one that
diminishes interest in more effective legally binding agreements, reduces pressure on states to
pursue such alternatives, creates the false impression of agreement when there is none, and
induces false expectations that may later lead to disagreement and increased conflict when those
expectations are disappointed.302
Commentators who are not optimistic about hard law approaches in space have suggested
that the different and apparently irreconcilable interests of different states are responsible for
preventing the conclusion of any new legally binding multilateral agreement in the field of space
law since 1979.303 In this environment, bottom-up soft law approaches may continue to be an
option for progress in some areas, particularly where consensus can be achieved on various
technical and procedural issues and incorporated in non-binding standards and guidelines (which
in turn may ultimately lead to hard rules in conventions or customary international law).
However, the security matters addressed by the Code are not conducive to resolution by
soft law approaches, nor do they comprise an area in which soft law instruments effectively lay
the foundation for the development of legally binding rules. Soft law in this context may instead
present an obstacle to development of such hard rules, even more so when ambiguities in these
instruments allow subscribing states to take competing positions and approaches with respect to
key rules.304
Rather than forming an agreed basis for the development of future norms, non-binding and
indeterminate instruments in these situations may, as noted, be nothing more than a form of a
“deferred confrontation” or simply reflect a profound lack of consensus on issues that are
necessary to conclude a legally binding agreement.305 Instead of creating a solid foundation on
which to build new legally binding obligations, soft law here may instead make such new legally
binding norms even more difficult to achieve.
The design choices for the Code thus appear to reflect a large degree of continuing
disagreement – and this lack of consensus is further demonstrated by the continuing unwillingness
of several key spacefaring nations to subscribe to it. The struggles of the Code do not, however,
indicate a need for more soft law. Instead, they indicate a need for targeted hard law initiatives
(involving the participation of all major space stakeholders) to serve as a first step in addressing
the most widely acknowledged threats confronting the safety and security of objects in space –
301
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while attempting to avoid the most common traps or obstacles to arms control efforts in a highly
unstable geopolitical environment like space.
B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space
Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or
weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues
that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some
seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.
The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or
other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of
modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking
to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find
space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or
conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an
adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308
The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate
involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent
the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding
arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the
“essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely
viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and
military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on
discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal
evaluation.310
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Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent
difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive
roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates
over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology
underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague
and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own
confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do
not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.
These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have
figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous
decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to
the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states
from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus
effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems.314 Furthermore,
even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to
technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China
with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315
C. Maintain a Focus on the Most Harmful Conduct
The first steps in successfully addressing the greatest threats to space -- which must be
consciously undertaken against the backdrop of suspicion, insecurity and fears of a space arms
race -- are not sweeping and unverifiable bans on weapons or military technologies.316 Instead,
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solutions lie in legally binding prohibitions on specific types of the most harmful conduct,
restrictions which are also likely to benefit from more feasible methods of verification.
The best target for an initial multilateral agreement effort aimed at increasing safety and
security in space is not difficult to find. The widely acknowledged, dangerous and growing
problem of debris in space is well documented, as is the very real threat that it poses to all future
uses of space. ASAT tests rank among the greatest concerns in the creation of such debris, as
evidenced by the hugely damaging effects of the 2007 Chinese test (which inspired the drafting of
the Code). The destruction of one large satellite alone can create as much debris as would
otherwise by generated by 70 to 80 years of ordinary space activity under strict debris mitigation
measures.317 It is thus suggested that an urgent and important first step in preventing the further
production of space debris is an international agreement banning the testing of destructive (debrisgenerating) ASATs.318
No international agreement currently bans the testing, deployment or use of ASATs. With
the exception of a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the Outer
Space Treaty, no space weapons are currently prohibited by any international agreement at all.319
As noted, even the IADC Guidelines (and the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that
they inspired), fail to address the problem of ASAT testing. Such gaps support the larger
criticism by many states and legal experts that the existing legal framework governing space is
not adequate to ensure the security of space objects or prevent an arms race in space.320 Yet
addressing all these deficiencies at once is not a necessary first step.
Instead of attempting to prohibit broad categories of technology and their use (or
designating all ASATs as a prohibited class of weapons), there should be a focus on specific
conduct involving the most damaging ASAT weapons technology – interceptor vehicles or “hitto-kill” systems employing kinetic energy (KE) – which represent the greatest current threat of
weapons-related debris generation in space.321 Fortuitously, the testing of these weapons also
presents a particular type of conduct that is within the competence of states to clearly define,
regulate and verify under an appropriate international legal regime.322
Prohibiting tests of KE, hit-to-kill, debris-generating ASATs (or “destructive” ASAT
tests) restricts the use of a weapon that appears to be in the early stages of spreading around the
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world, addresses real and effective technologies (while resisting futile attempts to define and
regulate future exotic technologies), and maintains a narrow focus on banning the most
threatening current technology – thus avoiding the difficulties inherent in achieving
comprehensive arms control agreements.323 Because the orbital lifetime of fragments is shorter in
low-earth orbits than in higher orbits (where there may be little or no natural orbital decay due to
atmospheric drag), it is has been suggested that an explicit ban on ASAT testing in higher
geosynchronous orbits would be especially compelling.324
The growing threat of orbital space debris now threatens to make space unusable for all
spacefaring countries, even for the great space powers. Once before, when nuclear tests in space
by the superpowers in the Cold War brought competing nations to the brink of ruining orbital
space and causing great damage on earth, both sides accepted mutual restraint to avert disaster
and concluded a legally binding, multilateral agreement banning nuclear tests in space.325 For all
spacefaring countries, and especially for the major space powers, the time for similar, focused,
legally-binding restraint with respect to the issue of ASAT testing appears to have arrived.
D. Develop Solutions in the Context of Insecurity, the Geopolitics of Space, and U.S.
Skepticism
China, Russia and the United States have all successfully demonstrated ASAT capabilities
in tests of various ASAT systems, including some which apparently involved directed energy
weapons (particularly lasers) designed to incapacitate or “dazzle” satellites in non-destructive
tests.326 However, the Russian government has not conducted a destructive ASAT test since 1983
and the last debris-generating American ASAT test took place in 1985.327 While the Chinese
government has continued to develop new ASAT capabilities, it was clearly surprised by the
widespread international outrage over its 2007 ASAT test and has not conducted any similar
debris-generating tests since that time.328 Although these three ASAT-active countries appear to

323

Lewis, supra note 318, at 23.
MACDONALD, supra note 306, at 30. As previously noted, however, debris in low earth orbit may persist for
many decades, presenting a persistent threat to all spacecraft passing through it.
325
MOLTZ, supra note 94, at 28-29 (2014) (noting that a 1.4 megaton nuclear test in 1962 400km above earth created
such large EMP emissions that it disabled seven satellites in low earth orbit.); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313 T.I.A.S. 5433. Similarly, in spite
of the tension and mutual mistrust that characterized the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able
to develop specific, legally-binding rules and procedures governing the activities and interaction of their military
forces in areas other than space (notably on the high seas) to better ensure the safety of navigation and reduce the
possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the failure of communication. See U.S.-Soviet Agreement on the
Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. 7379, 852 U.N.T.S. 151.
326
Laura Grego, A History of Anti-Satellite Programs, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 5-6, (January 2009)
http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf.
327
Id.; see Koplow, supra note 283, at 1210 (noting that the 300 pieces of trackable debris generated by the last U.S
destructive ASAT test on September 13, 1985, took nineteen years to degrade out of orbit.).
328
Phillip C. Saunders, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on
“China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 10 (February 18, 2015), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/Saunders_Testimony2.18.15.pdf (noting that Chinese officials appear to have learned from the mistakes they
made in both the conduct of the 2007 ASAT test and how the information was presented publicly and observing that
“subsequent 2010 and 2013 tests…were conducted against sub-orbital targets and did not create any long-lived space
debris.”).
324

57

have little interest in conducting further destructive ASAT tests, they nonetheless have much to
lose if other states pursue such testing.
New destructive ASAT tests would not only threaten space with vast new clouds of debris,
but would also bring new fears, instability and risks of weaponization.329 A new wave of
destructive ASAT weapon tests is not unimaginable, since countries other than China, Russia and
the United States, including India, Israel, and Japan, remain interested in developing hit-to-kill
ASAT technology.330 As rivalries in space expand far beyond the confines of the Cold War, it is
important to note that even a limited conflict in space could be devastating, since the debris
generated by such a conflict could result in the possible loss of near-earth orbit.331
Beyond the potential strategic benefits for the United States of a legally binding
multilateral ban on destructive ASAT tests, no country has a greater stake than the United States
in minimizing the amount of orbital debris (since it makes the most use of space).332 The most
serious policy concern related to such a ban, at least in the view of some skeptical members of the
U.S. Congress, remains the possible negative impact on U.S. BMD programs.333 For this reason,
the United States may prefer to pursue a partial but nonetheless effective ban on the most
destructive ASAT testing, one which is limited to at least prohibiting tests above a specified
altitude (thus greatly reducing or eliminating the production of any long-lived debris while still
permitting effective ballistic missile interception tests at lower altitudes).334
To be effective, a ban on ASAT testing should be incorporated in a legally binding
international convention that includes the major spacefaring states. Through this mechanism,
states can convey credible commitments to not conduct ASAT tests, provide assurances of their
compliance, and establish a framework with clear obligations on which arms control compliance,
monitoring and verification measures can be built. It would also provide a solid foundation for
making a prohibition on destructive ASAT tests a rule of customary international law.335
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Participation by the legislatures of participating states in approving or authorizing the agreement
would further advance these goals and also strengthen the credibility of underlying state
commitments.
With respect to U.S. involvement in a ban on destructive ASAT tests, a legally binding
agreement (benefitting from the authorization or approval of the U.S. Congress in the form of a
treaty, congressional-executive agreement, or statutory authorization) that clearly prohibits such
ASAT tests would more effectively contribute to the emergence of binding legal norm under
customary international law and also enhance rather than diminish the leadership role that the
United States has long played in the development of international space law.336
A final, practical, strategic reality remains for the United States and other countries as they
contemplate the conclusion of appropriate legally binding multilateral conventions restricting
ASAT tests or other explicitly defined harmful conduct in space. U.S. military planners (as well
as the military authorities of the other space powers) must remain prepared to protect their assets
in space in the event of a conflict in the strategically vital domain of space.
In spite of the goals of peaceful cooperation in space, U.S. military doctrine clearly
requires the U.S. forces to be capable in time of conflict to take measures “to prevent an
adversary's hostile use of US/third-party space capabilities,” to successfully engage in “offensive
operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities used to interfere with or attack US/allied
space systems,” and to “negate adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial,
degradation, or destruction actions.”337 Achieving these mission objectives seems highly unlikely
if U.S. forces do not have the necessary weapons to achieve and maintain superior military
capabilities.338
Some commentators have thus suggested that while the United States continues to pursue
appropriate multilateral security agreements (such a one banning debris-generating ASAT tests)
and continues to refrain from taking clearly provocative actions in space (particularly the flight
testing and deployment of clearly dedicated space weaponry), it should maintain a “hedging
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strategy against space warfare capabilities or unpleasant surprises.”339 Such a hedging strategy
requires, among other things, laboratory research and development of basic ASAT technologies
with a central goal of “providing assurance that the United States is not surprised, and
technologically outdistanced, by advances in ASAT capabilities that another country is able to
achieve.”340
With these goals in mind, any arms control agreement or soft law instrument that the
United States contemplates joining which will regulate space activities must be sufficiently
precise to ensure that no implicit or de facto restrictions are imposed on essential defense
capabilities or the ability to engage in strategic “hedging” (particularly military space R&D
programs).341 As discussed above, however, the broad and imprecise terms of the Code may raise
concerns that the scrutiny of military programs by civil society in liberal democracies could result
in de facto restrictions on important military R&D space weapon programs and related activities.
Part VI: Conclusion
Efforts to prevent the proliferation of space debris cannot be fully realized without also
dealing with the threat to the sustainable use of space posed by destructive ASAT tests. The
Code’s proposed application of its own variant of soft law to these very different but related
problem areas unfortunately portends failure. Modest but important progress in both these areas
is, however, feasible through limited hard law approaches which focus on destructive ASAT
testing in the context of the reality of acute security concerns.
Such tailored hard law approaches offer a genuine “next step” in solving the most serious
problems confronting the international community in space. They also complement, rather than
interfere with, successful bottom-up soft law approaches which have allowed the space agencies
of leading spacefaring states to generate technical guidelines reducing the routine generation of
orbital space debris. These hard law approaches stand in stark contrast to the flawed variant of
soft law embodied in the Code, one which risks confusion and increased insecurity even as it
distracts states from pursuing more effective models.
While the U.S. government has indicated some interest in pursuing a ban on destructive
ASAT tests, no proposal to ban ASAT tests is under consideration at this time. In spite of the
merits of such an initiative, U.S. government officials indicated in late 2014 that no decision has
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been made to propose such an agreement.342 When asked to further explain this position during
recent Congressional hearings, administration officials repeated that they had no plans to pursue a
ban on debris-generating ASAT testing, noting instead that “[c]urrently, our diplomatic focus is
on the development of an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities.”343
The Code thus continues to consume the time and effort of the government of the United
States and the governments of other states in the international community, diverting resources that
could otherwise be dedicated to more meaningful steps to improve safety and security of space.
In this sense, the proposed Code is not just a looming failure on the horizon but, to use another
helpful space metaphor, it is also a black hole exerting a strong gravitational pull that few
governments seem able to resist.
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